IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/restat/v75y1993i3p409-17.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Supervision and Wages across Industries

Author

Listed:
  • Neal, Derek

Abstract

This paper uses supervision data from a supplement to the 1977 wave of the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics to examine differences in supervision and wages across industries and to evaluate relationships between supervision practices and interindustry wage differentials. The results demonstrate that workers in high-wage industries are supervised with equal or greater stringency than secondary sector workers. Further, the results offer no evidence that interindustry differences in monitoring contribute to interindustry wage differentials. Such findings appear to contradict explanations for industry wage premiums that are motivated by efficiency wage models of shirking. Copyright 1993 by MIT Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Neal, Derek, 1993. "Supervision and Wages across Industries," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 75(3), pages 409-417, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:75:y:1993:i:3:p:409-17
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6535%28199308%2975%3A3%3C409%3ASAWAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6&origin=bc
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Walsh, Frank, 1999. "A Multisector Model of Efficiency Wages," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 351-376, April.
    2. Derek Neal & Sherwin Rosen, 1998. "Theories of the Distribution of Labor Earnings," NBER Working Papers 6378, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Steven Ross & Yves Zenou, 2003. "Shirking, Commuting and Labor Market Outcomes," Working papers 2003-41, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    4. Ross, Stephen L. & Zenou, Yves, 2008. "Are shirking and leisure substitutable? An empirical test of efficiency wages based on urban economic theory," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 498-517, September.
    5. Andreas P. Georgiadis, 2006. "Is there a Wage-Supervision Trade-Off? Efficiency Wages Evidence From the 1990 British Workplace Industrial Relations Survey," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 06/152, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    6. Daniel Parent, 2001. "Incentive Pay in the United States: Its Determinants and Its Effects," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-04, CIRANO.
    7. Ben-Ner, Avner & Kong, Fanmin & Lluis, Stéphanie, 2012. "Uncertainty, task environment, and organization design: An empirical investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 281-313.
    8. Zenou, Yves, 2006. "Efficiency wages and unemployment in cities: The case of high-relocation costs," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 49-71, January.
    9. Evenson, R.E. & Kimhi, A. & DeSilva, S., 2000. "Supervision and Transaction Costs: Evidence from Rice Farms in Bicol, the Philippines," Papers 814, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
    10. Wang, Yongjin & Zhao, Laixun, 2015. "Saving good jobs from global competition by rewarding quality and efforts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 426-434.
    11. Robert E. Evenson & Ayal Kimhi & Sanjaya DeSilva, 2000. "Supervision and Transaction Costs: Evidence from Rice Farms in Bicol, the Philippines," Working Papers 814, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    12. John G. Sessions & Nikolaos Theodoropoulos, 2014. "Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring," Research in Labor Economics,in: New Analyses of Worker Well-Being, volume 38, pages 105-162 Emerald Publishing Ltd.
    13. Dennis Dittrich & Martin G. Kocher, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-098/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    14. Dittrich, Dennis & Kocher, Martin, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee under Endogenous Supervision," CEPR Discussion Papers 5962, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Sessions, John G., 2008. "Wages, supervision and sharing," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 653-672, November.
    16. Ourania Karakosta & Nikos Tsakiris, 2009. "Indirect Tax Reforms and Public Goods under Imperfect Competition," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 5-2009, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    17. Herbold, Daniel, 2013. "Effort Incentives and On-the-Job Search: An Alternative Role for Efficiency Wages in Employment Contracts," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79983, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    18. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2003:i:34:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Tetteh, Rebecca & Mohammed, Safura & Ahmed Azumah, Ayisha, 2017. "What is the effect of wages and supervision on productivity? The perspective of Sunyani Technical University staff," MPRA Paper 81473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Zenou, Yves, 2005. "The Todaro Paradox Revisited," IZA Discussion Papers 1861, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    21. Avner Ben-Ner & Fanmin Kong & Stephanie Lluis, "undated". "Uncertainty and Organization Design," Working Papers 0107, Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus).
    22. Cheryl Long & Richard Boylan, 2003. "Firm Size And Monitoring," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(34), pages 1-5.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:75:y:1993:i:3:p:409-17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kristin Waites). General contact details of provider: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.