Wages as Sorting Mechanisms in Competitive Markets with Asymmetric Information: A Theory of Testing
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Angrist, Joshua D. & Guryan, Jonathan, 2008.
"Does teacher testing raise teacher quality? Evidence from state certification requirements,"
Economics of Education Review,
Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 483-503, October.
- Joshua D. Angrist & Jonathan Guryan, 2003. "Does Teacher Testing Raise Teacher Quality? Evidence from State Certification Requirements," NBER Working Papers 9545, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joshua D. Angrist & Jonathan Guryan, 2007. "Does Teacher Testing Raise Teacher Quality? Evidence from State Certification Requirements," Working Papers 21, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Education Research Section..
- Angrist, Joshua & Guryan, Jonathan, 2005. "Does Teacher Testing Raise Teacher Quality? Evidence from State Certification Requirements," IZA Discussion Papers 1500, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Stupnytska, Yuliia, 2015. "Asymmetric information in a search model with social contacts," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 548, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Andrew Weiss, 1985. "High School Graduation, Performance and Earnings," NBER Working Papers 1595, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hahn, Volker, 2017.
"Committee design with endogenous participation,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 388-408.
- Volker Hahn, 2013. "Committee Design with Endogenous Participation," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2013-12, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
- Hahn, Volker, 2016. "Committee Design with Endogenous Participation," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145599, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Anders Frederiksen & Elod Takats, 2005.
"Layoffs as Part of an Optimal Incentive Mix: Theory and Evidence,"
881, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Frederiksen, Anders & Takáts, Elöd, 2006. "Layoffs as Part of an Optimal Incentive Mix: Theory and Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 2447, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Anders Frederiksen & Elõd Takáts, 2006. "Layoffs as Part of an Optimal Incentive Mix: Theory and Evidence," MNB Working Papers 2006/2, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary).
- Andrew Weiss & Ruqu Wang, 1990. "A Sorting Model of Labor Contracts: Implications for Layoffs and Wage-Tenure Profiles," NBER Working Papers 3448, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Macpherson, David A. & Prasad, Kislaya & Salmon, Timothy C., 2014. "Deferred compensation vs. efficiency wages: An experimental test of effort provision and self-selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 90-107.
- Lee, Wayne L & Thakor, Anjan V & Vora, Gautam, 1983.
"Screening, Market Signalling, and Capital Structure Theory,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 38(5), pages 1507-1518, December.
- Wayne L. Lee & Anjan V. Thakor & Gautam Vora, 2004. "Screening, Market Signalling, and Capital Structure Theory," Finance 0411023, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
- Francesco Squintani, 1999. "On-the-Job Signaling and Self-Confidence," Discussion Papers 1274, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Fishman, Arthur, 1992. "The Informative Role of Prices in Markets with Endogenously Informed Buyers," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275564, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, 1987. "Macro-Economic Equilibrium and Credit Rationing," NBER Working Papers 2164, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Devereux, Paul J & Hart, Robert A & Roberts, J Elizabeth, 2013.
"Job spells, employer spells, and wage returns to tenure,"
Stirling Economics Discussion Papers
2013-01, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
- Devereux, Paul J. & Hart, Robert A. & Roberts, J. Elizabeth, 2013. "Job Spells, Employer Spells, and Wage Returns to Tenure," IZA Discussion Papers 7384, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Laura Giuliano, 2007. "Minimum wage effects on employment, substitution, and the quality of the teenage labor supply: Evidence from personal data," Working Papers 0723, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Wang, Ruqu & Weiss, Andrew, 1998. "Probation, layoffs, and wage-tenure profiles: A sorting explanation," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 359-383, September.
- Jhon Alexander Méndez Sayago & Hugo Alfonso Hernández Escolar, 2014. "Relación de largo plazo y análisis de causalidad y sensibilidad entre los salarios reales y la productividad laboral en el sector manufacturero a partir de cifras de los departamentos en Colombia," Revista Finanzas y Política Económica, Universidad Católica de Colombia, vol. 6(2), pages 341-366, September.
- repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
- Jhon Alexander Méndez Sayago, 2014. "Plusvalía, salario real y eficiencia del trabajo en el sector manufacturero en Colombia," Revista Apuntes del Cenes, Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, June.
- Anders Frederiksen & Elod Takats, 2005. "Layoffs as Part of an Optimal Incentive Mix: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 881, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:47:y:1980:i:4:p:653-664.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press). General contact details of provider: .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.