IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v24y1991i2p460-70.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Monitoring Workers as a Screening Device

Author

Listed:
  • Avner Bar-Ilan

Abstract

This paper presents a model of trade-off between employee moral hazard and adverse selection. When productivity is unobservable and heterogeneous, a firm can use the information extracted from shirking (moral hazard) to alleviate the problem of adverse selection and improve its pool of workers. This generates equilibrium shirking and monitoring even if any shirking can be eliminated using employee bonds. The point is demonstrated in a model in which performance bonds serve as an incentive device and in another model in which efficiency wages serve this purpose.

Suggested Citation

  • Avner Bar-Ilan, 1991. "Monitoring Workers as a Screening Device," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 460-470, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:24:y:1991:i:2:p:460-70
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%28199105%2924%3A2%3C460%3AMWAASD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K
    Download Restriction: only available to JSTOR subscribers

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Choudhri, Ehsan U & Kochin, Levis A, 1980. "The Exchange Rate and the International Transmission of Business Cycle Disturbances: Some Evidence from the Great Depression," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(4), pages 565-574, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rachael E. Goodhue & Dale M. Heien & Hyunok Lee & Daniel A. Sumner, 2003. "Contracts and Quality in the California Winegrape Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 23(3_4), pages 267-282, December.
    2. Neunzig, Alexander R., 2002. "Effiziente Fixlöhne, Arbeitsfreude und Crowding-Effekte," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-03, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    3. Neunzig, Alexander R., 2002. "Effiziente Fixlöhne, Arbeitsfreude und Überwachungskosten," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-02, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    4. Hilmer, Michael J., 2002. "Student migration and institution control as screening devices," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 19-25, June.
    5. Canegallo, Claudia, 1999. "Funzionamento del mercato del lavoro in presenza di informazione asimmetrica. Una rassegna della letteratura," POLIS Working Papers 8, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
    6. Neunzig, Alexander R., 2002. "Effiziente Fixlohnverträge für arbeitsfreudige Arbeitnehmer mit Berichtspflichten," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-05, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    7. Neunzig, Alexander R., 2002. "Mehraufgaben-Prinzipal-Agenten-Analyse: Effiziente Arbeitsverträge für abwechslungsbegrüßende Arbeitnehmer," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-04, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:24:y:1991:i:2:p:460-70. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ceaaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.