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Cognitive Ability and Observed Behavior in Laboratory Experiments: Implications for Macroeconomic Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Nobuyuki Hanaki

    (Université Côte d'Azur
    CNRS, GREDEG
    IUF)

Abstract

This paper discusses the relationships between the \measured" cognitive ability of participants and their behavior as observed during laboratory experiments. Based on such relationships, macroeconomic implications of micro-level "boundedly rational" individual behavior will be discussed. The paper also addresses potential problems that arise when insucient attention is paid to large di erences in the measured cognitive ability of participants across several experimental laboratories, in uencing the replicability of existing experimental results but also the interpretation of results from cross-country experimental analyses, and proposes to complement participants' database with individual characteristics.

Suggested Citation

  • Nobuyuki Hanaki, 2019. "Cognitive Ability and Observed Behavior in Laboratory Experiments: Implications for Macroeconomic Theory," GREDEG Working Papers 2019-22, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
  • Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2019-22
    as

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    File URL: http://www.gredeg.cnrs.fr/working-papers/GREDEG-WP-2019-22.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cognitive Ability; Laboratory Experiments; Strategic Environment Effect;

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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