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Experts Playing the Traveler's Dilemma

We analyze a one-shot experiment on the traveler's dilemma in which members of the Game Theory Society, were asked to submit both a (possibly mixed) strategy and their belief concerning the average strategy of their opponents. Very few entrants expect and play the unique Nash equilibrium, while we observe a fifth playing the cooperative solution of the game, i.e. a strictly dominated strategy. The experimental data suggest to analyze the game as one of incomplete information. Most strategies observed are in the support of its Bayesian Nash equilibria. A notable exception is the Nash equilibrium strategy of the original game.

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File URL: http://www.uni-hohenheim.de/RePEc/hoh/papers/252.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany in its series Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim with number 252/2005.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hoh:hohdip:252
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  1. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2001. "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1402-1422, December.
  2. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July.
  3. David Kreps & Paul Milgrom & John Roberts & Bob Wilson, 2010. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 239, David K. Levine.
  4. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
  5. Ariel Rubinstein, 2004. "Dilemmas of An Economic Theorist," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 354, Econometric Society.
  6. Basu, Kaushik, 1994. "The Traveler's Dilemma: Paradoxes of Rationality in Game Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 391-95, May.
  7. Philip A. Haile & Ali Hortacsu & Grigory Kosenok, 0820. "On the Empirical Content of Quantal Response Equilibrium," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1432R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 0820.
  8. C. Monica Capra, 1999. "Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 678-690, June.
  9. Simon P. Anderson & Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 1999. "The Logit Equilibrium: A Perspective on Intuitive Behavioral Anomalies," Virginia Economics Online Papers 332, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
  10. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December.
  11. Mathias Erlei, 2003. "Heterogeneous Social Preferences," TUC Working Papers in Economics 0001, Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Technische Universität Clausthal (Department of Economics, Technical University Clausthal), revised Jun 2004.
  12. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  13. C. Monica Capra & Susana Cabrera & Rosario Gómez, 2003. "The Effects of Common Advice on One-shot Traveler’s Dilemma Games: Explaining Behavior through an Introspective Model with Errors," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/17, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  14. Charles A. Holt & Jacob K. Goeree, 1999. "Stochastic Game Theory: For Playing Games, Not Just for Doing Theory," Virginia Economics Online Papers 306, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
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