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M Equilibrium: A Theory of Beliefs and Choices in Games

Author

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  • Jacob K. Goeree
  • Philippos Louis

Abstract

We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered unrelated. M equilibrium is empirically robust and, despite being set-valued, falsifiable. Results from a series of experiments that compare M equilibrium to leading behavioral game theory models demonstrate its virtues in predicting observed choices and stated beliefs. Data from experimental games with a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and multiple M equilibria exhibit coordination problems that could not be anticipated through the lens of existing models.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacob K. Goeree & Philippos Louis, 2021. "M Equilibrium: A Theory of Beliefs and Choices in Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(12), pages 4002-4045, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:111:y:2021:i:12:p:4002-45
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201683
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Mäder, 2024. "Financial Crises as a Phenomenon of Multiple Equilibria and How to Select among Them," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(2-3), pages 517-536, March.
    2. Evan Friedman & Duarte Gonc{c}alves, 2023. "Quantal Response Equilibrium with a Continuum of Types: Characterization and Nonparametric Identification," Papers 2307.08011, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    3. Shu Huang & Russell Golman, 2025. "The collective wisdom of behavioral game theory," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 79(1), pages 341-356, February.
    4. Jacob K Goeree & Bernardo Garcia-Pola, 2023. "S Equilibrium: A Synthesis of (Behavioral) Game Theory," Papers 2307.06309, arXiv.org.
    5. Yu Gui & Bahar Tac{s}kesen, 2025. "Statistical Equilibrium of Optimistic Beliefs," Papers 2502.09569, arXiv.org.
    6. Yang, Zhenzhong & Guo, Ping & Wang, Lijun & Hao, Qingyang, 2024. "Multi-objective optimization analysis of hydrogen internal combustion engine performance based on game theory," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 374(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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