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The collective wisdom of behavioral game theory

Author

Listed:
  • Shu Huang

    (Carnegie Mellon University)

  • Russell Golman

    (Carnegie Mellon University)

Abstract

We apply an algorithm from the wisdom-of-crowds literature to optimally combine behavioral game theory models to more accurately predict strategic choice in one-shot, simultaneous-move games. We find that the optimal weighted average of seven behavioral game theory models predicts out-of-sample choice behavior significantly better than any of the individual models. The crowd of behavioral game theory models is wiser than any single one of them. Different strategic choice models complement each other by capturing distinct patterns of behavior. The field of behavioral game theory is enriched by having this diversity of models.

Suggested Citation

  • Shu Huang & Russell Golman, 2025. "The collective wisdom of behavioral game theory," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 79(1), pages 341-356, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:79:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-024-01571-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01571-y
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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