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Jörg Naeve

Personal Details

First Name:Jörg
Middle Name:
Last Name:Naeve
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pna51
http://www.esb-reutlingen.de/business-school/organisation/professoren-und-dozenten/naeve.html
ESB Business School Reutlingen University Alteburgstr. 150 72762 Reutlingen
++49 7121 271 3071
Terminal Degree:1995 Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften; Universität Bielefeld (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

(in no particular order)

Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (Institute of Economics)
Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften (Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences)
Universität Hohenheim (University of Hohenheim)

Hohenheim, Germany
http://www.uni-hohenheim.de/institution/institut-fuer-economics-11

0711/459-22992
0711/459-22993
D-70593 Stuttgart
RePEc:edi:ivhohde (more details at EDIRC)

ESB Business School
Hochschule Reutlingen (University of Applied Sciences Reutlingen)

Reutlingen, Germany
http://www.esb-reutlingen.de/




RePEc:edi:sbreude (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Naeve, Jörg, 2017. "The Nash bargaining solution is Nash implementable," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 276, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  2. Tilman Becker & Michael Carter & Jörg Naeve, 2005. "Experts Playing the Traveler's Dilemma," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 252/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
  3. Vincent Merlin & Jörg Naeve, 2000. "Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 191/2000, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany, revised 25 Sep 2001.
    repec:bon:bonsfa:572 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg & Jörg Naeve, 2002. "Lexicographic measurement of the information contained in opportunity sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(1), pages 155-173.
  2. Naeve, Jorg, 2000. "Maximax, leximax, and the demanding criterion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 313-325, November.
  3. Chattopadhyay, Subir & Corchon, Luis & Naeve, Jorg, 2000. "Contingent commodities and implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 293-298, September.
  4. Naeve, Jorg, 1999. "Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 23-28, January.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Naeve, Jörg, 2017. "The Nash bargaining solution is Nash implementable," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 276, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.

    Cited by:

    1. Naeve, Jorg, 1999. "Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 23-28, January.

  2. Tilman Becker & Michael Carter & Jörg Naeve, 2005. "Experts Playing the Traveler's Dilemma," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 252/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Morone & Piergiuseppe Morone, 2012. "Individual and Group Behaviours in the Traveller's Dilemma: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 2012/09, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    2. Wright, James R. & Leyton-Brown, Kevin, 2017. "Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 16-37.
    3. Andrea Morone & Piergiuseppe Morone, 2016. "The Focal Point In The Traveller'S Dilemma: An Experimental Study," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(S1), pages 123-132, December.
    4. Baader, Malte & Vostroknutov, Alexander, 2017. "Interaction of reasoning ability and distributional preferences in a social dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 79-91.
    5. Ispano, Alessandro & Schwardmann, Peter, 2017. "Cooperating Over Losses and Competing Over Gains: a Social Dilemma Experiment," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 23, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    6. Kaushik Basu & Leonardo Becchetti & Luca Stanca, 2011. "Experiments with the Traveler's Dilemma: Welfare, Strategic Choice and Implicit Collusion," CEIS Research Paper 188, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 23 Mar 2011.
    7. Mounir, Angie & Perea, Andrés & Tsakas, Elias, 2018. "Common belief in approximate rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 6-16.
    8. Halpern, Joseph Y. & Pass, Rafael, 2012. "Iterated regret minimization: A new solution concept," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 184-207.
    9. Wolpert David & Jamison Julian & Newth David & Harre Michael, 2011. "Strategic Choice of Preferences: the Persona Model," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-39, August.
    10. Becchetti, Leonardo, 2011. "Voting with the Wallet," AICCON Working Papers 94-2011, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
    11. Christian Bach & Andrés Perea, 2014. "Utility proportional beliefs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 881-902, November.
    12. Rodrigo Moro & Esteban Freidin & Fernando Tohmé, 2015. "Social preferences are not enough: Accounting for anomalous behavior in a complex mixed-motive game," REVISTA CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA, UN - RCE - CID, March.

  3. Vincent Merlin & Jörg Naeve, 2000. "Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 191/2000, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany, revised 25 Sep 2001.

    Cited by:

    1. Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2017. "The greatest unhappiness of the least number," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(3), pages 637-655, December.
    2. José García-Lapresta & A. Marley & Miguel Martínez-Panero, 2010. "Characterizing best–worst voting systems in the scoring context," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(3), pages 487-496, March.
    3. Eliora Hout & Harrie Swart & Annemarie Veer, 2006. "Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 459-475, December.
    4. Orhan Erdem & M. Sanver, 2005. "Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(1), pages 31-42, October.

Articles

  1. Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg & Jörg Naeve, 2002. "Lexicographic measurement of the information contained in opportunity sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(1), pages 155-173.

    Cited by:

    1. BOSSERT, Walter & SUZUMURA, Kotaro, 2008. "Rationality, External Norms and the Epistemic Value of Menus," Cahiers de recherche 10-2008, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    2. BARBERA, Salvador & BOSSERT, Walter & PATTANAIK, Prasanta K., 2001. "Ranking Sets of Objects," Cahiers de recherche 2001-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.

  2. Naeve, Jorg, 2000. "Maximax, leximax, and the demanding criterion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 313-325, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Merlin & Jörg Naeve, 2000. "Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 191/2000, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany, revised 25 Sep 2001.
    2. Mosquera, M.A. & Borm, P. & Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G. & García-Jurado, I. & Voorneveld, M., 2008. "Characterizing cautious choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 143-155, March.

  3. Chattopadhyay, Subir & Corchon, Luis & Naeve, Jorg, 2000. "Contingent commodities and implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 293-298, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    2. Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081207, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

  4. Naeve, Jorg, 1999. "Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 23-28, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2017. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization," Discussion Paper Series 662, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    2. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    3. Trockel,W., 2001. "Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory?," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 322, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    4. Trockel,W., 1999. "On the Nash program for the Nash bargaining solution," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 306, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    5. Trockel,W., 1999. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 305, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    6. Matteo Triossi & Luis Corchón, 2006. "Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 24, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    7. Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2008. "Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 190(3), pages 659-671, November.
    8. Haake, Claus-Jochen & Trockel, Walter, 2011. "On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 393, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    9. Walter Trockel, 1999. "Integrating the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory," UCLA Economics Working Papers 787, UCLA Department of Economics.
    10. Trockel,W., 1999. "A universal meta bargaining realization of the Nash solution," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 310, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    11. Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2016. "On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 83-107, December.
    12. Walter Trockel, 1999. "On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution," UCLA Economics Working Papers 788, UCLA Department of Economics.
    13. Trockel,W., 1999. "Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 308, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    14. Duman, Papatya & Trockel, Walter, 2016. "On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash Solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein’s game," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 550, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2004-02-23
  2. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2005-02-01
  3. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2005-02-01
  4. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2004-02-23

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