IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003

This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory. (Copyright: Fundación SEPI)

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.brown.edu/academics/economics/sites/brown.edu.academics.economics/files/uploads/wp2004/2004-20_paper.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2004-20.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-20
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 677-690, May.
  2. Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999. "An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.
  3. Serrano, Roberto, 1993. "Non-cooperative Implementation of the Nucleolus: The 3-Player Case," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 345-57.
  4. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "Reinterpreting the Kernel," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 58-80, November.
  5. Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Bargaining and Bargaining Sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 292-308, May.
  6. Gul, Faruk, 1989. "Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 81-95, January.
  7. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1994. "Bargaining and value," Economics Working Papers 114, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 1995.
  8. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Economics Working Papers 0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  9. John C. Harsanyi, 1974. "An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(11), pages 1472-1495, July.
  10. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 463-77, April.
  11. Alcalde, Jose & Perez-Castrillo, David & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 1998. "Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 469-480, October.
  12. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May.
  13. Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 61, pages 2271-2326 Elsevier.
  14. Naeve, Jorg, 1999. "Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 23-28, January.
  15. Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1997. "Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games," Economics Working Papers 217, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  16. Montero, M.P., 1999. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Discussion Paper 1999-121, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  17. Trockel,W., 1999. "A universal meta bargaining realization of the Nash solution," Working Papers 310, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  18. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525.
  19. Herrero, Maria Jose, 1989. "The nash program: Non-convex bargaining problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 266-277, December.
  20. Trockel,W., 1999. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Working Papers 305, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  21. Howard, J. V., 1992. "A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 142-159, February.
  22. Sergiu Hart & Zohar Levy, 1997. "Efficiency Does Not Imply Immediate Agreement," Game Theory and Information 9709001, EconWPA.
  23. Güth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2004. "On the Nash Bargaining Solution with noise," Other publications TiSEM 2def5ecc-d422-4c00-b049-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  24. repec:dgr:kubcen:1999121 is not listed on IDEAS
  25. Ezra Einy & David Wettstein, 1999. "A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 219-230.
  26. Roberto Serrano, 1996. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Working Papers 161, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  27. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  28. Trockel,W., 2001. "Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory?," Working Papers 322, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  29. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-129218 is not listed on IDEAS
  30. Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80, January.
  31. Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  32. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 1999. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," Working Papers 1053, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  33. Maschler, M & Owen, G, 1989. "The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 389-407.
  34. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Implementing the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set," Working Papers 2001-24, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  35. Miyagawa, Eiichi, 2002. "Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 292-308, November.
  36. Massimo Morelli & Maria Montero, 2001. "The Demand Bargaining Set: General Characterization and Application to Majority Games," Economics Working Papers 0011, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  37. Faruk Gul, 1999. "Efficiency and Immediate Agreement: A Reply to Hart and Levy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 913-918, July.
  38. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  39. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2000. "Implementation of Bargaining Sets via Simple Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 106-120, April.
  40. Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December.
  41. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, . "Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 461.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  42. Evans, Robert, 1997. "Coalitional Bargaining with Competition to Make Offers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 211-220, May.
  43. Selten,Reinhard & Wooders,Myrna, . "A game equilibrium model of thin markets," Discussion Paper Serie B 144, University of Bonn, Germany.
  44. Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Competitive Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(3), pages 577-85, May.
  45. Moulin, H., 1984. "Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 32-45, June.
  46. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
  47. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2007. "The procedural value for cooperative games with non-transferable utility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 46-52, January.
  48. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  49. Ehud Kalai, 1978. "A Group Incentive Compatible Mechanism Yielding Core Allocation," Discussion Papers 329, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  50. repec:dgr:kubcen:199961 is not listed on IDEAS
  51. Krishna, V. & serrano, R., 1993. "Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining," Papers 10-93-31, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  52. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
  53. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "Bargaining with commitments," Game Theory and Information 0306002, EconWPA.
  54. Okada, Akira, 1996. "A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 97-108, September.
  55. Walter Trockel, 2000. "Implementations of the Nash solution based on its Walrasian characterization," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 277-294.
  56. Moldovanu Benny & Winter Eyal, 1995. "Order Independent Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 21-34, April.
  57. Trockel,W., 1999. "Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions," Working Papers 308, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  58. Serrano, Roberto, 1995. "Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 319-329.
  59. Peraz-Castrillo, J., 1992. "Cooperative Outcomes Through Non-Cooperative Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 165.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  60. Winter, Eyal, 1994. "The Demand Commitment Bargaining and Snowballing Cooperation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 255-73, March.
  61. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
  62. Perry, M. & Rany, P., 1992. "A Non-Cooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9203, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  63. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
  64. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj & Sengupta, Kunal & Vohra, Rajiv, 1989. "A consistent bargaining set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 93-112, October.
  65. Winter Eyal, 1994. "Non-cooperative Bargaining in Natural Monopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 202-220, October.
  66. Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
  67. Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
  68. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  69. Serrano Roberto, 1995. "A Market to Implement the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 285-294, October.
  70. Rosenmueller,J. & Trockel,W., 2001. "Game theory," Working Papers 321, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  71. Thomson, A., 1989. "The Consistency Principle," RCER Working Papers 192, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  72. Lagunoff Roger D., 1994. "A Simple Noncooperative Core Story," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 54-61, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Brown Economics Webmaster)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.