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Implementation theory

In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Author

Listed:
  • Palfrey, Thomas R.

Abstract

This chapter surveys the branch of implementation theory initiated by Maskin (1999). Results for both complete and incomplete information environments are covered.

Suggested Citation

  • Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 61, pages 2271-2326, Elsevier.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamchp:3-61
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    Cited by:

    1. Lin, Chung-cheng & Yang, C.C., 2008. "The firm as a community explaining asymmetric behavior and downward rigidity of wages," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 390-400, November.
    2. Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine," Working Papers 2007-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    3. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
    4. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    5. Weber, Thomas A. & Bapna, Abhishek, 2008. "Bayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 394-403, February.
    6. Cabrales, Antonio & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 360-374.
    7. Byungchae Rhee, 2008. "A characterization of optimal feasible tax mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(4), pages 619-653, May.
    8. Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081207, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    9. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    10. Antonio Cabrales & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Implemetation in Adaptive Better-Response Dynamics," Working Papers wp2007_0708, CEMFI.
    11. Byungchae Rhee, 2004. "A Characterization of Optimal Feasible Tax Mechanism," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 551, Econometric Society.
    12. Altun, Ozan Altuğ & Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Implementation with a sympathizer," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 36-49.
    13. Eric Maskin, 2004. "The Unity of Auction Theory: Paul Milgrom's Masterclass," Economics Working Papers 0044, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    14. Claude d'Aspremont & Jacques Crémer & Louis-André Gérard-Varet, 2003. "Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 281-310, October.
    15. Chung-cheng Lin & C.C. Yang, 2006. "The Firm as a Community Explaining Asymmetric Behavior and Downward Rigidity of Wages," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 06-A014, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    16. Doğan, Battal, 2017. "Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 103-110.

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    JEL classification:

    • C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods

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