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Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003

  • Roberto Serrano

    (Brown University)

This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory. (Copyright: Fundación SEPI)

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Article provided by Fundación SEPI in its journal Investigaciones Económicas.

Volume (Year): 29 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 219-258

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Handle: RePEc:iec:inveco:v:29:y:2005:i:2:p:219-258
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