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Bargaining and value

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The authors present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form. This leads to a unified solution theory for such games that have as special cases the Shapley value in the transferable utility case, the Nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case, and the recently introduced Maschler-Owen consistent value in the general nontransferable utility case. Moreover, the authors show that any variation (in a certain class) of their bargaining procedure which generates the Shapley value in the transferable utility setup must yield the consistent value in the general nontransferable utility setup. Copyright 1996 by The Econometric Society.
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  • Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1994. "Bargaining and value," Economics Working Papers 114, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 1995.
  • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:114
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    1. Giovannetti, Giorgia & Marcet, Albert & Marimon, Ramon, 1993. "Growth, capital flows and enforcement constraints : The case of Africa," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 418-425, April.
    2. Marimon, Ramon, 1993. "Adaptive learning, evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium selection in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 603-611, April.
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