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Aid Effectiveness and Limited Enforceable Conditionality

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  • Almuth Scholl

    (Economics, Institute of Economic Policy Humboldt University Berlin)

Abstract

This paper analyzes optimal foreign aid policy in a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the donor and the recipient government. Aid conditionality is modelled as a limited enforceable contract. We define conditional aid policy to be self-enforcing if, at any point in time, the conditions imposed on aid funds are supportable by the threat of a permanent aid cutoff from then onward. Quantitative results show that the effectiveness of unconditional aid is low while self-enforcing conditional aid strongly stimulates the economy. However, increasing the welfare of the poor comes at a high cost: to ensure aid effectiveness, less democratic political regimes have to receive permanently larger aid funds

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  • Almuth Scholl, 2006. "Aid Effectiveness and Limited Enforceable Conditionality," 2006 Meeting Papers 292, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed006:292
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    2. Nikolai Stähler, 2013. "Recent Developments In Quantitative Models Of Sovereign Default," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(4), pages 605-633, September.
    3. Carter, Patrick, 2014. "Aid allocation rules," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 132-151.
    4. Bauducco, Sofia & Caprioli, Francesco, 2014. "Optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy with limited commitment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 302-315.
    5. Temple, Jonathan R.W., 2010. "Aid and Conditionality," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4415-4523, Elsevier.
    6. Atsuko Tanaka, "undated". "Notes on Foreign Aid Selectivity Based on Human Capital," Working Papers 2015-23, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 27 Sep 2015.
    7. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2016. "Gradualism in aid and reforms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 108-123.
    8. Ngoc-Sang PHAM & Thi Kim Cuong PHAM, 2017. "Economic growth and escaping the poverty trap: how does development aid work?," Working Papers P197, FERDI.
    9. Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador, 2011. "Growth in the Shadow of Expropriation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(2), pages 651-697.
    10. Almuth Scholl, 2018. "Debt Relief for Poor Countries: Conditionality and Effectiveness," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 85(339), pages 626-648, July.
    11. Fink, Fabian & Scholl, Almuth, 2016. "A quantitative model of sovereign debt, bailouts and conditionality," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 176-190.
    12. Carter, Patrick & Postel-Vinay, Fabien & Temple, Jonathan, 2015. "Dynamic aid allocation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 291-304.
    13. Li, Larry & Sy, Malick & McMurray, Adela, 2015. "Insights into the IMF bailout debate: A review and research agenda," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 891-914.
    14. David Victor, 2013. "Foreign Aid for Capacity-Building to Address Climate Change: Insights and Applications," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2013-084, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    15. Stéphane Pallage & Michel A. Robe, 2015. "Counterpart funding requirements and the foreign aid procyclicality puzzle," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(3-4), pages 462-480.
    16. Victor, David G., 2013. "Foreign Aid for Capacity-Building to Address Climate Change: Insights and Applications," WIDER Working Paper Series 084, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    foreign aid; conditionality; limited enforceable contracts; growth; sovereignty;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E13 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Neoclassical
    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations

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