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Explaining the Allocation of Bilateral and Multilateral Environmental Aid to Developing Countries

  • Hicks, Robert L.
  • Parks, Bradley C.
  • Tierney, Michael J.

In this paper we examine how international development assistance for environmental purposes is allocated to developing countries. In particular, we investigate whether there are patterned differences between environmental aid for international public goods projects versus environmental projects having more localized impacts. We empirically investigate these questions using project project level development assistance data.

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File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19346
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Paper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI with number 19346.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea05:19346
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  1. Tammy L. Lewis, 2003. "Environmental Aid: Driven by Recipient Need or Donor Interests?," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 84(1), pages 144-161.
  2. Dollar, David & Alesina, Alberto, 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Scholarly Articles 4553020, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  3. Burnside, Craig & Dollar, David, 1998. "Aid, the incentive regime, and poverty reduction," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1937, The World Bank.
  4. Hansen, Henrik & Tarp, Finn, 2000. "Aid and Growth Regressions," MPRA Paper 62288, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Azam, Jean-Paul & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2003. "Contracting for aid," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 25-58, February.
  6. P. Guillaumont & L. Chauvet, 2001. "Aid and Performance: A Reassessment," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(6), pages 66-92.
  7. Kapur, Devesh, 2002. "The Common Pool Dilemma of Global Public Goods: Lessons from the World Bank's Net Income and Reserves," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 337-354, March.
  8. Dollar, David & Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programmes?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(466), pages 894-917, October.
  9. Collier, Paul & Dollar, David, 2001. "Can the World Cut Poverty in Half? How Policy Reform and Effective Aid Can Meet International Development Goals," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(11), pages 1787-1802, November.
  10. Boone, Peter, 1996. "Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 289-329, February.
  11. Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 61-84, February.
  12. Graham Bird & Dane Rowlands, 2000. "The catalyzing role of policy-based lending by the IMF and the World Bank: fact or fiction?," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(7), pages 951-973.
  13. Svensson, Jakob, 1998. "Foreign aid and rent-seeking," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1880, The World Bank.
  14. Collier, Paul & Dollar, David, 2002. "Aid allocation and poverty reduction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1475-1500, September.
  15. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
  16. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-69, August.
  17. Shavell, Steven, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 541-62, November.
  18. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521808187 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Devesh Kapur, 2001. "Expansive agendas and weak instruments: governance related conditionalities of international financial institutions," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(3), pages 207-241.
  20. Nielson, Daniel L. & Tierney, Michael J., 2003. "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(02), pages 241-276, March.
  21. Graham Bird & Dane Rowlands, 1997. "The Catalytic Effect of Lending by the International Financial Institutions," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(7), pages 967-991, November.
  22. Gould, Erica R., 2003. "Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund Conditionality," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(03), pages 551-586, June.
  23. Kaul, Inge & Conceicao, Pedro & Le Goulven, Katell & Mendoza, Ronald U. (ed.), 2003. "Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195157413, March.
  24. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-77, Fall.
  25. Bertin Martens, 2005. "Why Do Aid Agencies Exist?," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 23(6), pages 643-663, November.
  26. Isham, Jonathan & Kaufmann, Daniel & Pritchett, Lant H, 1997. "Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the Performance of Government Projects," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 11(2), pages 219-42, May.
  27. William Easterly & Ross Levine & David Roodman, 2003. "New Data, New doubts: A Comment on Burnside and Dollar's "Aid, Policies, and Growth" (2000)," NBER Working Papers 9846, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  28. William Easterly, 2003. "Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 23-48, Summer.
  29. Isham, Jonathan & Kaufmann,Daniel, 1995. "The forgotten rationale for policy reform : the productivity of investment projects," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1549, The World Bank.
  30. Anne O. Krueger, 1998. "Whither the World Bank and the IMF?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(4), pages 1983-2020, December.
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