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Explaining the Allocation of Bilateral and Multilateral Environmental Aid to Developing Countries

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  • Hicks, Robert L.
  • Parks, Bradley C.
  • Tierney, Michael J.

Abstract

In this paper we examine how international development assistance for environmental purposes is allocated to developing countries. In particular, we investigate whether there are patterned differences between environmental aid for international public goods projects versus environmental projects having more localized impacts. We empirically investigate these questions using project project level development assistance data.

Suggested Citation

  • Hicks, Robert L. & Parks, Bradley C. & Tierney, Michael J., 2005. "Explaining the Allocation of Bilateral and Multilateral Environmental Aid to Developing Countries," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19346, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea05:19346
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.19346
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