Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making
We develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility, and we prove that the principals' Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action. We apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public finance, where organized special interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lumpâ€ sum taxes or transfers. The lobbies use only the nondistorting transfers in their noncooperative equilibrium, but their intergroup competition for transfers turns into a prisoners' dilemma in which the government captures all the gain that is potentially available to the parties.
|Date of creation:||1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Political Economy -Chicago-|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Littauer Center, Cambridge, MA 02138|
Web page: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/
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- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
- Peter J. Hammond, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 263-282.
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