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Read my lips: the political economy of information transmission

Author

Listed:
  • Tim Besley

    (Institute for Fiscal Studies and London School of Economics)

  • Rohini Pande

    (Institute for Fiscal Studies)

Abstract

The paper studies credible information transmission by governments. A group of heterogenous individuals have to make private investment and labor supply decisions while relying on the government for information about investment returns. The government consists of a an elected citizen who chooses a redistributive strategy in addition to providing information. We give conditions under which the outcome leads to over- or under-investment in high return activities and the outcome is Pareto efficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Tim Besley & Rohini Pande, 1998. "Read my lips: the political economy of information transmission," IFS Working Papers W98/13, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:98/13
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    Cited by:

    1. Lagunoff, Roger, 2006. "Credible communication in dynastic government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 59-86, January.
    2. Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. "Hiding information in electoral competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 48-74, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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