IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v103y1995i6p1210-35.html

On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests

Author

Listed:
  • Coate, Stephen
  • Morris, Stephen

Abstract

An important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests. The Chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently. The Virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient 'sneaky' methods of redistribution. This paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests. It shows that, when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predisposition of politicians, inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995. "On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-1235, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:103:y:1995:i:6:p:1210-35
    DOI: 10.1086/601449
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/601449
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. See http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE for details.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/601449?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anonymous, 1991. "Monetary Policy Statement," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 54, march.
    2. William Mitchell, 1988. "Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-five years of public choice and political science," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 101-119, February.
    3. N/A, 1987. "Chapter I. The Home Economy," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 119(1), pages 6-23, February.
    4. N/A, 1991. "Appraisal: Monetary and Fiscal Policy," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 136(1), pages 5-6, May.
    5. N/A, 1987. "Chapter I. The Home Economy," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 120(1), pages 6-20, May.
    6. N/A, 1987. "Chapter I. the Home Economy," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 122(1), pages 7-23, November.
    7. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    8. A. M. A. van Deemen, 1991. "Coalition Formation in Centralized Policy Games," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(2), pages 139-161, April.
    9. Worswick,G. D. N., 1991. "Unemployment: A Problem of Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521400343, Enero-Abr.
    10. N/A, 1987. "Chapter I. the Home Economy," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 121(1), pages 6-20, August.
    11. Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 37-49, March.
    12. Michael Crew & Charles Rowley, 1988. "Toward a public choice theory of monopoly regulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 49-67, April.
    13. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    14. Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1971. "Optimal Mechanisms for Income Transfer," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 324-334, June.
    15. N/A, 1987. "Chaptefi III. the British Economy Since 1979," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 122(1), pages 41-46, November.
    16. Breton, Albert, 1993. "Toward a Presumption of Efficiency in Politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 53-65, September.
    17. -, 1991. "Latin American commodity exports: policy issues," Sede de la CEPAL en Santiago (Estudios e Investigaciones) 29787, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    18. Britton,Andrew J. C., 1991. "Macroeconomic Policy in Britain 1974–1987," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521410045, Enero-Abr.
    19. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
    20. repec:ecr:col114:27977 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Philip Jung & Moritz Kuhn, 2019. "Earnings Losses and Labor Mobility Over the Life Cycle," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 678-724.
    2. Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S, 1994. "The Determinants of U.S. Labor Disputes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 180-209, April.
    3. Juhn, Chinhui & Murphy, Kevin M, 1997. "Wage Inequality and Family Labor Supply," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 72-97, January.
    4. Neal, Derek, 1995. "Industry-Specific Human Capital: Evidence from Displaced Workers," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(4), pages 653-677, October.
    5. Merlo, Antonio, 1997. "Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 101-131, February.
    6. Sattinger, Michael, 1995. "General Equilibrium Effects of Unemployment Compensation with Labor Force Participation," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(4), pages 623-652, October.
    7. Suthawan Prukumpai, 2015. "Time-varying Industrial Portfolio Betas under the Regime-switching Model: Evidence from the Stock Exchange of Thailand," Applied Economics Journal, Kasetsart University, Faculty of Economics, Center for Applied Economic Research, vol. 22(2), pages 54-76, December.
    8. Harrison, Alan & Stewart, Mark, 1994. "Is Strike Behavior Cyclical?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(4), pages 524-553, October.
    9. Heaton, John & Lucas, Deborah J, 1996. "Evaluating the Effects of Incomplete Markets on Risk Sharing and Asset Pricing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(3), pages 443-487, June.
    10. Baker, Michael, 1997. "Growth-Rate Heterogeneity and the Covariance Structure of Life-Cycle Earnings," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 338-375, April.
    11. Prendergast, Canice & Stole, Lars, 1996. "Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1105-1134, December.
    12. Reilly, Kevin T, 1994. "Annual Hours and Weeks in a Life-Cycle Labor Supply Model: Canadian Evidence on Male Behavior," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(3), pages 460-477, July.
    13. Feldstein, Martin, 1995. "The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 551-572, June.
    14. Mccorriston, Steve & Sheldon, Ian, 1989. "Imperfect Competition, Trade Policy and Processed Agricultural Products," Occasional Papers 232831, Regional Research Project NC-194: Organization and Performance of World Food Systems.
    15. Belzil, Christian, 1996. "Relative Efficiencies and Comparative Advantages in Job Search," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(1), pages 154-173, January.
    16. Y. Stephen Chiu, 2002. "On the Feasibility of Unpopular Policies under Re‐Election Concerns," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 68(4), pages 841-858, April.
    17. Hans Gersbach, 2004. "Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 157-177, October.
    18. Julia Cage, 2009. "Asymmetric information, rent extraction and aid efficiency," Working Papers halshs-00575055, HAL.
    19. Dulleck, Uwe & Wigger, Berthold U., 2015. "Politicians as experts, electoral control, and fiscal restraints," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 106-116.
    20. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482, Elsevier.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:103:y:1995:i:6:p:1210-35. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.