Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy
This chapter surveys the recent literature on the theory of macroeconomic policy. We study the effect of various incentive constraints on the policy making process, such as lack of credibility, political opportunism, political ideology, and divided government. The survey is organized in three parts. Part I deals with monetary policy in a simple Phillips curve model: it covers credibility issues, political business cycles, and optimal design of monetary institutions. Part II deals with fiscal policy in a dynamic general equilibrium set up: the main topics here are credibility of tax policy, and political determinants of budget deficits. Part III studies economic growth in models with endogenous fiscal policy.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||03 Nov 1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.iies.su.se/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0630. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Hanna Christiansson)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.