Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy
This paper surveys the recent literature on the theory of macroeconomic policy. We study the effect of various incentive constraints on the policy-making process, such as lack of credibility, political opportunism, political ideology, and divided government. The survey is organized in three parts. Part I deals with monetary policy in a simple Phillips curve model, and focuses on credibility, political business cycles, and optimal design of monetary institutions. Part II deals with fiscal policy in a dynamic general equilibrium set up; the main topics covered in this section are credibility of tax policy, and political determinants of budget deficits. Part III studies economic growth in models with endogenous fiscal policy.
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|Date of creation:||Dec 1997|
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