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Why is fiscal policy often procyclical?

Listed author(s):
  • Alberto Alesina
  • Guido Tabellini

Fiscal policy is procyclical in many developing countries. We explain this policy failure with a political agency problem. Procyclicality is driven by voters who seek to "starve the Leviathan" to reduce political rents. Voters observe the state of the economy but not the rents appropriated by corrupt governments. When they observe a boom, voters optimally demand more public goods or lower taxes, and this induces a procyclical bias in fiscal policy. The empirical evidence is consistent with this explanation: Procyclicality of fiscal policy is more pronounced in more corrupt democracies. (JEL: E62, D73, D78) (c) 2008 by the European Economic Association.

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 784828000000000465.

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Date of creation: 06 Oct 2005
Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000465
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