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Current expenditure upswings in good times and public investment downswings in bad times? New evidence from developing countries

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  • Ardanaz, Martín
  • Izquierdo, Alejandro

Abstract

Anecdotal evidence suggests that policymakers usually cannot resist the temptation of spending more on current expenditure (e.g., wages, transfers) in good times and mostly pick public investment to adjust during bad times. In this paper, we answer the following questions: do current expenditures and public investment react differently to the business cycle? If so, why? In a sample of more than 100 developing countries and 30 developed countries observed between 1980 and 2014, a new empirical regularity specific to developing countries is identified: upswings are associated with increases in current primary expenditures only, while public investment falls and current spending remains acyclical during downturns. Evidence is also presented that this asymmetrical response is more pronounced in countries where incumbent politicians face shorter time horizons and weak institutions. Other types of determinants traditionally discussed in the literature have limited explanatory power.

Suggested Citation

  • Ardanaz, Martín & Izquierdo, Alejandro, 2022. "Current expenditure upswings in good times and public investment downswings in bad times? New evidence from developing countries," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 118-134.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:50:y:2022:i:1:p:118-134
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2021.06.002
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cyclicality; Public spending; Fiscal asymmetry; Institutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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