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A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms

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  • Andres Velasco

Abstract

This paper develops a political-economic model of fiscal policy one in which" government resources are a common property' out of which interest groups can finance" expenditures on their preferred items. This setup has striking macroeconomic implications. " First, fiscal deficits and debt accumulation occur even when there are no reasons for intertemporal smoothing. Second deficits can be eliminated through a fiscal reform, but such a reform may only take place after a" delay during which government debt is built up.

Suggested Citation

  • Andres Velasco, 1997. "A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms," NBER Working Papers 6336, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6336
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    1. repec:eee:jmacro:v:53:y:2017:i:c:p:222-234 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Adriana Arreaza & Bent E. Sgrensen & Oved Yosha, 1999. "Consumption Smoothing through Fiscal Policy in OECD and EU Countries," NBER Chapters,in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 59-80 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Jean Imbs & Romain Rancière, 2005. "The Overhang Hangover," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 06-03, Swiss Finance Institute.
    4. Avellan, Leopoldo & Vuletin, Guillermo, 2015. "Fiscal procyclicality and output forecast errors," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 193-204.
    5. Alesina, Alberto & Hausmann, Ricardo & Hommes, Rudolf & Stein, Ernesto, 1999. "Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Latin America," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 253-273, August.
    6. Frankel, Jeffrey A. & Vegh, Carlos A. & Vuletin, Guillermo, 2013. "On graduation from fiscal procyclicality," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 32-47.
    7. Bussiere, Matthieu & Mulder, Christian, 2000. "Political Instability and Economic Vulnerability," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 5(4), pages 309-330, October.
    8. Corinna Ahlfeld, 2009. "The scapegoat of heterogeneity - How fragmentation influences political decisionmaking," Departmental Discussion Papers 143, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    9. Ihori, Toshihiro & Itaya, Jun-ichi, 2001. "A dynamic model of fiscal reconstruction," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 779-797, November.
    10. Guerguil, Martine & Mandon, Pierre & Tapsoba, René, 2017. "Flexible fiscal rules and countercyclical fiscal policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 189-220.
    11. Takero Doi & Toshihiro Ihori & Hiroki Kondo, 2002. "Government Deficits, Political Inefficiency, and Fiscal Reconstruction in Japan," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 3(1), pages 169-183, May.
    12. Benjamin E. Diokno, 2010. "Philippine fiscal behavior in recent history," Philippine Review of Economics, University of the Philippines School of Economics and Philippine Economic Society, vol. 47(1), pages 39-87, June.
    13. Baqir, Reza, 1999. "Districts, spillovers, and government overspending," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2192, The World Bank.
    14. Martín Ardanaz & Alejandro Izquierdo, 2017. "Current Expenditure Upswings in Good Times and Capital Expenditure Downswings in Bad Times?: New Evidence from Developing Countries," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 8558, Inter-American Development Bank.
    15. Robert Lavigne, 2006. "The Institutional and Political Determinants of Fiscal Adjustment," Staff Working Papers 06-1, Bank of Canada.
    16. Guillermo Vuletin, 2013. "Exchange Rate Regimes And Fiscal Discipline: The Role Of Capital Controls," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(4), pages 2096-2109, October.
    17. Arze del Granado, Javier & Gupta, Sanjeev & Hajdenberg, Alejandro, 2013. "Is Social Spending Procyclical? Evidence for Developing Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 16-27.
    18. Lavigne, Robert, 2011. "The political and institutional determinants of fiscal adjustment: Entering and exiting fiscal distress," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 17-35, March.
    19. Guillermo Javier Vúletin, 2002. "Regímenes Cambiarios y Performance Fiscal ¿Generan los Regímenes Fijos Mayor Disciplina que los Flexibles?," Department of Economics, Working Papers 042, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
    20. Ihori, Toshihiro & Doi, Takero & Kondo, Hiroki, 2001. "Japanese fiscal reform: fiscal reconstruction and fiscal policy," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 351-370, December.
    21. Sanjeev Gupta & Alejandro Hajdenberg & Javier Arze del Granado, 2010. "Is Social Spending Procyclical?," IMF Working Papers 10/234, International Monetary Fund.
    22. Ricardo Hausmann & Alberto Alesina & Rudolf Hommes & Ernesto H. Stein, 1998. "Instituciones presupuestarias y desempeño fiscal en América Latina," Research Department Publications 4161, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    23. Guillermo J. Vuletin, 2004. "Exchange Rate Regimes And Fiscal Performance. Do Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes Generate More Discipline Than Flexible Ones?," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 474, Econometric Society.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents

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