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Reforming Budgetary Institutions in Latin America: The Case for a National Fiscal Council

  • Barry Eichengreen
  • Ricardo Hausmann
  • Jürgen Von Hagen

Latin America's economies have made tremendous improvements in recent years. Following the lost decade of the 1980s, economic growth has resumed. But the fruits of this progress remain to be consolidated. The political consensus supporting reform is fragile, and the economies of the region are still susceptible to destabilizing shocks, as recent events have underscored. Even well-devised economic policy strategies can be thrown off course by disturbances. This article proposes an institutional reform—a National Fiscal Council—designed to allow Latin American countries to break out of this vicious circle. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Open Economies Review.

Volume (Year): 10 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 415-442

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Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:10:y:1999:i:4:p:415-442
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  1. Ricardo Hausmann & Alberto Alesina & Rudolf Hommes & Ernesto H. Stein, 1998. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America," Research Department Publications 4160, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  2. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
  3. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Destabilizing Effects of Exchange-Rate Escape Clauses," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt15n3p5dt, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  4. Barry Eichengreen and Tamim Bayoumi., 1993. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Restrictions: Implications for Europe from the United States," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C93-020, University of California at Berkeley.
  5. Cukierman, Alex & Edwards, Sebastian & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "Seigniorage and Political Instability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 537-55, June.
  6. Barry Eichengreen & Jürgen Hagen, 1996. "Fiscal restrictions and monetary union: Rationales, repercussions, reforms," Empirica, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 3-23, February.
  7. Buiter, W.H. & Corsetti, G. & Roubini, N., 1992. "Excessive Deficits: Sense and Nonsence in the Treaty of Maastricht," Papers 674, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  8. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-88, December.
  9. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1994. "Monetary policy in economic transition: Lessons from the French post-war experience," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 891-898, April.
  10. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-71, October.
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