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Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland

  • Rafal Benecki
  • Jens Hölscher
  • Mariusz Jarmuzek

This paper discusses the link between the deficit bias in public finance and institutional settings. The Polish experience is put in a wider context and provides an extensive discussion of possible institutional reforms that may be implemented to stabilise the path of fiscal policy and reduce the deficit bias. Although substantial improvements have been made in Poland with respect to fiscal transparency standards set by the IMF and EU there is still much scope for enhancement. The recommended change in fiscal policy would involve the implementation of medium-term budgetary framework that would ensure consistency between the budgetary process and medium-term fiscal goals. This should be accompanied by the introduction of binding constraints on fiscal policy. The expenditure rule could be reintroduced to strengthen fiscal discipline, as it could force policymakers to tighten fiscal policy. It seems to be indispensable to maintain fiscal rules at the local government level. The issue of still limited fiscal transparency and unsatisfactory performance of fiscal rules requires the undertaking of various appropriate measures to strengthen the policy framework in Poland. This can be done in our view by involving external institution entitled to examine fiscal transparency and the performance of fiscal rules in the budgetary process. We think that the institution that is fully capable to take the lead in this respect is the NIK, which was granted full independence in 1994 and has since proved to be successful in overseeing public finances. This should, however, be accompanied by simultaneous enhancement of the internal audit.

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Paper provided by CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research in its series CASE Network Studies and Analyses with number 0327.

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Length: 35 Pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sec:cnstan:0327
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