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Patching up the Pact: some Suggestions for Enhancing Fiscal Sustainability and Macroeconomic Stability in an Enlarged European Union

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  • Buiter, Willem H.
  • Grafe, Clemens

Abstract

The paper considers the implications for the EU accession candidates of Central and Eastern Europe of the fiscal-financial constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact and the Maastricht Treaty. Our findings apply also to those current EU members whose initial conditions (e.g. infrastructure and progress in state pension reform) or other structural characteristics (e.g. demographic structure, growth potential, Balassa-Samuelson equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation) differ significantly from the EU average. We find the existing criteria to be seriously flawed and propose an alternative rule, the Permanent Balance Rule, based on a strong from of tax smoothing.

Suggested Citation

  • Buiter, Willem H. & Grafe, Clemens, 2002. "Patching up the Pact: some Suggestions for Enhancing Fiscal Sustainability and Macroeconomic Stability in an Enlarged European Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 3496, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3496
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    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Fatás & Ilian Mihov, 2010. "The Euro and Fiscal Policy," NBER Chapters,in: Europe and the Euro, pages 287-324 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Óscar Afonso & Rui Henrique Alves, 2006. "“To Deficit or Not to Deficit”: Should European Fiscal Rules Differ Among Countries?," FEP Working Papers 219, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    3. Heikki Oksanen, 2003. "Population ageing and public finance targets," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 196, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    4. Szapáry, György & Orbán, Gábor, 2004. "A stabilitási és növekedési paktum az új tagállamok szemszögéből
      [The Stabilization and Growth Pact in the light of the new EU member-states]
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 810-831.
    5. Elena Flores & Gabriele Giudice & Alessandro Turrini, 2005. "The framework for fiscal policy in EMU: What future after five years of experience?," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 223, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    6. Mauro Visaggio, 2004. "Does Stability and Growth Pact Provide an Adequate and Consistent Fiscal Rule?," Macroeconomics 0407008, EconWPA.
    7. Coricelli, Fabrizio & Ercolani, Valerio, 2002. "Cyclical and Structural Deficits on the Road to Accession: Fiscal Rules for an Enlarged European Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 3672, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Orban, Gabor & Szapary, Gyorgy, 2004. "The Stability and Growth Pact from the perspective of the new member states," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 26(7), pages 839-864, October.
    9. Barry Eichengreen, 2004. "Institutions for Fiscal Stability," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 50(1), pages 1-25.
    10. Galí, Jordi & Perotti, Roberto, 2003. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Integration in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 3933, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Waltraud Schelkle, 2003. "A Mixed Blessing: Monetary Enlargement within the Maastricht Policy Framework," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 72(4), pages 624-635.
    12. Gábor Kutasi, 2017. "Unsustainable Public Debt in a European Fiscal Union?," REVISTA FINANZAS Y POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA, UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE COLOMBIA, vol. 9(1), pages 25-39, February.
    13. Dora Győrffy, 2007. "Deficit Bias and Moral Hazard on the Road to the EMU: The Political Dimension of Fiscal Policy in Hungary," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(1), pages 1-16.
    14. Mauro VISAGGIO, "undated". "Does the Growth and Stability Pact Provide an Adequate and Consistent Fiscal Rule?," EcoMod2004 330600154, EcoMod.
    15. Johnson, Richard, 2003. "A comparison of the constant-tax rule and a standard fiscal reaction rule in the IMF's MULTIMOD model," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 25(6-7), pages 639-653, September.
    16. Lucjan T Orlowski, 2005. "Monetary Policy Adjustments on the Final Passage towards the Euro," Macroeconomics 0503022, EconWPA.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    EU accession; fiscal sustainability; golden rule; stability and growth pact; tax smoothing;

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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