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The political economy of public investment

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  • Roel M.W.J.Beetsma
  • Frederick van der Ploeg

Abstract

The political distortions in public investment projects are investigated within the context of a bipartisan political economy framework. The role of scrapping and modifying projects of previous governments receives special attention. The party in government has an incentive to overspend on large ideological public investment projects in order to bind the hands of its successor. This leads to a bias for excessive debt, especially if the probability of being removed from office is large. These political distortions have implications for the appropriate format of a fiscal rule. A deficit rule, like the Stability and Growth Pact, mitigates the overspending bias in ideological investment projects and improves social welfare. The optimal second-best restriction on public debt exceeds the level of public debt that would prevail under the socially optimal outcome. Social welfare may be boosted even more by appropriate investment restrictions: with a restriction on (future) investment in ideological projects, the current government perceives a large benefit of a debt reduction. However, debt and investment restrictions are not needed if investment projects only have a financial return.

Suggested Citation

  • Roel M.W.J.Beetsma & Frederick van der Ploeg, 2007. "The political economy of public investment," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 276, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
  • Handle: RePEc:euf:ecopap:0276
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    Cited by:

    1. Ionita Predescu Lorena & Radu Florin & Tabirca Alina Iuliana, 2011. "Needs Of Local Sustainable Development," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(2), pages 91-97, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    political economy; bipartisan; public investment; ideological projects; market projects; scrapping public investment; golden rule; investment restriction; deficit rule; Beetsma; van der Ploeg;

    JEL classification:

    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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