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Reflections on the Fiscal Implications of a Common Currency


  • Buiter, Willem H.
  • Kletzer, Kenneth


This paper studies the likely consequences of monetary unification among the EC members for the conduct of fiscal policy in the EC countries (and by an emerging Federal European Fiscal Authority). Among the conclusions are the following. If the Eurofed is to be independent, the external exchange rate policy of the EC should be assigned to the Eurofed and not to the fiscal authorities. Effective (as opposed to formal) independence of the Eurofed is going to be very difficult to achieve. Coordinated upper ceilings on national public sector financial deficits are unnecessary and probably undesirable. Coordination of national public expenditure policies, tax policies and borrowing policies is in principle desirable for both efficiency and distributional reasons. The empirical models required for a serious welfare analysis of fiscal policy coordination do not yet exi.

Suggested Citation

  • Buiter, Willem H. & Kletzer, Kenneth, 1990. "Reflections on the Fiscal Implications of a Common Currency," CEPR Discussion Papers 418, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:418

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Dornbusch, Rudiger, 1989. " Real Exchange Rates and Macroeconomics: A Selective Survey," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 91(2), pages 401-432.
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    3. Miller, Marcus H & Weller, Paul, 1990. "Currency Bubbles Which Affect Fundamentals: A Qualitative Treatment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(400), pages 170-179, Supplemen.
    4. Bernard Dumas, 1989. "Super Contact and Related Optimality Conditions: A Supplement to AvinashDixits:"A Simplified Exposition of Some Results Concerning Regulated Brownian," NBER Technical Working Papers 0077, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Salant, Stephen W & Henderson, Dale W, 1978. "Market Anticipations of Government Policies and the Price of Gold," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(4), pages 627-648, August.
    6. Robert P. Flood & Peter M. Garber, 1989. "The Linkage Between Speculative Attack and Target Zone Models of Exchange Rates," NBER Working Papers 2918, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Paul R. Krugman, 1988. "Target Zones and Exchange Rate Dynamics," NBER Working Papers 2481, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Mussa, Michael, 1976. " The Exchange Rate, the Balance of Payments and Monetary and Fiscal Policy under a Regime of Controlled Floating," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 78(2), pages 229-248.
    9. Dornbusch, Rudiger, 1976. "Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(6), pages 1161-1176, December.
    10. Froot, Kenneth A. & Obstfeld, Maurice, 1991. "Exchange-rate dynamics under stochastic regime shifts : A unified approach," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3-4), pages 203-229, November.
    11. Dornbusch, Rudiger, 1987. "Exchange Rate Economics: 1986," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(385), pages 1-18, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jérôme Creel, 1999. "The stability pact and feedback policy effects," Working Papers hal-01064862, HAL.
    2. Robert Holzmann & Yves Hervé & Roland Demmel, 1996. "The maastricht fiscal criteria: Required but ineffective?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 25-58, February.
    3. Beetsma, Roel M W J & Bovenberg, A Lans, 2000. "Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(3-4), pages 247-269, March.
    4. Willem H. Buiter, 1999. "Alice in Euroland," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 181-209, June.
    5. Michael Artis & Massimiliano Marcellino, "undated". "Fiscal Solvency and Fiscal Forecasting in Europe," Working Papers 142, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    6. Andrew Brociner, 1993. "L'Union monétaire européenne : une revue de la littérature théorique," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 43(1), pages 349-363.
    7. Detken, Carsten, 1999. "Fiscal policy effectiveness and neutrality results in a non-Ricardian world," Working Paper Series 0003, European Central Bank.
    8. Michel Aglietta & Merih Uctum, 1995. "Fiscal consolidation in Europe," Research Paper 9519, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    9. Patricia S. Pollard, 1993. "Macroeconomic policy effects in a monetary union," Working Papers 1993-001, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    10. Buiter, Willem H. & Grafe, Clemens, 2002. "Patching up the Pact: some Suggestions for Enhancing Fiscal Sustainability and Macroeconomic Stability in an Enlarged European Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 3496, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Paul De Grauwe, 2010. "The Euro Experience and Lessons for the GCC Currency Union," Chapters,in: Currency Union and Exchange Rate Issues, chapter 4 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Eichengreen, Barry, 2001. "What problems can dollarization solve?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 267-277, April.


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