Alice in Euroland
The paper contains a detailed critique of the common currency arrangements of the Economic and Monetary Union, embodied in the laws and emerging procedural arrangements that govern the actions of its key institutions: the European Central Bank and the European System of Central Banks. The main message here is ''Great idea, shame about the execution''. A number of improvements are then proposed. Some of these require amending the Treaty, including an end to the rule that each EMU member''s national central bank has a seat on the Governing Council or the removal of the power of the Council of Ministers to give ''general orientations'' for exchange rate policy. Others, notably in the areas of accountability, openness and transparency, could be implemented immediately, including publication of voting records, minutes and the inflation forecast. Improved arrangements are also advocated for the co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policy. And the article calls for a European Parliament that can both bark and bite.
|Date of creation:||Apr 1999|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.|
Phone: +44 (020) 7405 7686
Web page: http://www.lse.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Martin Feldstein, 1997.
"The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 23-42, Fall.
- Martin Feldstein, 1998. "The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability," NBER Working Papers 6150, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Buiter, Willem H. & Sibert, Anne, 1997.
"Transition Issues for the European Monetary Union,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1728, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dooley, Michael, 1998. "Speculative Attacks on a Monetary Union?," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 3(1), pages 21-26, January.
- Buiter, Willem H. & Kletzer, Kenneth, 1990. "Reflections on the Fiscal Implications of a Common Currency," CEPR Discussion Papers 418, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Buiter, Willem H, 1997. "The Economic Case for Monetary Union in the European Union," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(4), pages 10-35, Supplemen.
- Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1998. "Subsidiarity and the European Union," NBER Working Papers 6556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:20226. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (LSERO Manager)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.