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Ideology and monetary policy. The role of political parties’ stances in the European Central Bank’s parliamentary hearings

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  • Fraccaroli, Nicolò
  • Giovannini, Alessandro
  • Jamet, Jean-François
  • Persson, Eric

Abstract

We investigate the link between ideology and the sentiments of parliamentarians when they speak to the central bank they hold accountable. To this end, we collect textual data on the quarterly hearings of the ECB President before the European Parliament from 1999 to 2019. We apply sentiment analysis to more than 1900 speeches of individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from 128 parties. We find robust evidence that MEPs’ sentiments towards the ECB are correlated with the ideological stance predominantly on a pro-/anti-European dimension rather than on a left–right dimension.

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  • Fraccaroli, Nicolò & Giovannini, Alessandro & Jamet, Jean-François & Persson, Eric, 2022. "Ideology and monetary policy. The role of political parties’ stances in the European Central Bank’s parliamentary hearings," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:74:y:2022:i:c:s0176268022000234
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102207
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    Cited by:

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    2. Koop, Christel & Scotto di Vettimo, Michele, 2023. "How do the media scrutinise central banking? Evidence from the Bank of England," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ideology; Central Bank Accountability; European Central Bank; European Parliament; Sentiment analysis; Central Bank Independence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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