The Politics of Central Bank Independence
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- de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Other publications TiSEM 34d07610-3844-4cf9-baa5-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Other publications TiSEM 54f2c3e3-46f2-4763-b1ac-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Jakob de Haan & Sylvester Eijffinger, 2016. "The politics of central bank independence," DNB Working Papers 539, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
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- Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2019. "Macroeconomic Institutions: Lessons from World Experience for MENA Countries," Working Papers 1311, Economic Research Forum, revised 21 Aug 2019.
- Bihari, Péter, 2017. "A jegybanki függetlenség és elszámoltathatóság a válság előtt és után [Independence and accountability of central banks before and after the global financial crisis]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(6), pages 573-593.
- Ad Van Riet, 2017.
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- van Riet, Ad, 2017. "The ECB's fight against low inflation : On the effects of ultra-low interest rates," Other publications TiSEM ec7f8a3b-a32e-42e4-8d01-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Itai Agur & Carola Binder & Cristina Bodea & Claudio Borio & Italo Colantone & Ana Carolina Garriga & Federico Favaretto & Stefan Gerlach & Ernest Gnan & Ryszard Kokoszczynski & Masaaki Higashijima & , 2020. "Populism, Economic Policies and Central Banking," SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum, number 2020/1 edited by Ernest Gnan and Donato Masciandaro, November.
- Dall’Orto Mas, Rodolfo & Vonessen, Benjamin & Fehlker, Christian & Arnold, Katrin, 2020. "The case for central bank independence: a review of key issues in the international debate," Occasional Paper Series 248, European Central Bank.
- Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019.
"Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy And Psychology," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19105, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Moiseev, S., 2018. "The Independence of Central Bank: Concept, Methods and Impact of Global Financial Crisis," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 40(4), pages 110-136.
More about this item
Keywords
central bank independence; fiscal dominance; determinantsof CBI;JEL classification:
- E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBA-2017-01-01 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2017-01-01 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2017-01-01 (Positive Political Economics)
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