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Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence

Author

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  • Berger, Helge
  • de Haan, Jakob
  • Eijffinger, Sylvester C W

Abstract

This paper reviews recent research on central bank independence (CBI). After we have distinguished between independence and conservativeness, the literature on optimal inflation contracts is discussed, followed by research in which the inflationary bias is endogenized. Finally, the various challenges that have been raised against previous empirical findings on CBI are reviewed. We conclude that the negative relationship between CBI and inflation is quite robust.

Suggested Citation

  • Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2000. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2353, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2353
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness; Inflation Targeting; Optimal Inflation Contracts;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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