Political institutions and central bank independence revisited
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2010.485923
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- Davide Ferrari & Barbara Pistoresi & Francesco Salsano, 2009. "Political institutions and central bank independence revisited," Department of Economics 0616, University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi".
References listed on IDEAS
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- Adam S. Posen, 1995. "Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 253-274, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by:
- de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016.
"The Politics of Central Bank Independence,"
Discussion Paper
2016-047, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Jakob de Haan & Sylvester Eijffinger, 2016. "The politics of central bank independence," DNB Working Papers 539, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Other publications TiSEM 54f2c3e3-46f2-4763-b1ac-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Other publications TiSEM 34d07610-3844-4cf9-baa5-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Barbara Pistoresi & Maddalena Cavicchioli & Giulio Brevini, 2017. "Central Bank Independence, financial instability and politics: new evidence for OECD and non-OECD countries," Department of Economics 0112, University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi".
- Andrieș, Alin Marius & Podpiera, Anca Maria & Sprincean, Nicu, 2020. "Central bank independence and systemic risk," BOFIT Discussion Papers 13/2020, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
- Ana Carolina Garriga, 2016. "Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(5), pages 849-868, October.
- Ning Xu & Jian Hong & Timothy C. G. Fisher, 2016.
"Model selection consistency from the perspective of generalization ability and VC theory with an application to Lasso,"
Papers
1606.00142, arXiv.org.
- Xu, Ning & Hong, Jian & Fisher, Timothy, 2016. "Model selection consistency from the perspective of generalization ability and VC theory with an application to Lasso," MPRA Paper 71670, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pistoresi B. & Cavicchioli M. & Brevini G., 2017. "Central Bank Independence, Financial Instability and Politics: New Evidence for OECD and Non-OECD Countries," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 9(7), pages 179-188, July.
- Barbara Pistoresi & Maddalena Cavicchioli & Giulio Brevini, 2017. "Central Bank Independence, financial instability and politics: new evidence for OECD and non-OECD countries," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 129, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
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JEL classification:
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
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