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Replacing a "Disobedient" Central Bank Governor with a "Docile" One: A Novel Measure of Central Bank Independence and Its Effect on Inflation

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  • GUILLERMO VULETIN
  • LING ZHU

Abstract

This paper identifies two mechanisms that empirical papers on central bank independence assume to be embedded in the yardstick measure of turnover rate of central bank governor: (i) the removal of a governor who is perceived as a challenger by the government and (ii) whether his/her replacement is an ally of the government. We identify the first mechanism with premature exits of central bankers and the second by examining whether or not the incoming governor is drawn from the ranks of the executive branch of the government. We find that only premature exits and replacements with government allies increase inflation.
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Suggested Citation

  • Guillermo Vuletin & Ling Zhu, 2011. "Replacing a "Disobedient" Central Bank Governor with a "Docile" One: A Novel Measure of Central Bank Independence and Its Effect on Inflation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(6), pages 1185-1215, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:43:y:2011:i:6:p:1185-1215
    DOI: j.1538-4616.2011.00422.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    2. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
    3. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    4. Garriga, Ana Carolina & Rodriguez, Cesar M., 2023. "Central bank independence and inflation volatility in developing countries," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 1320-1341.
    5. Luis Morano & Carlos A. Vegh & Diego Friedheim & Diego Rojas, "undated". "Between a Rock and a Hard Place," World Bank Publications - Reports 28443, The World Bank Group.
    6. Ha,Jongrim & Ivanova,Anna & Ohnsorge,Franziska Lieselotte & Unsal Portillo Ocando,Derya Filiz, 2019. "Inflation : Concepts, Evolution, and Correlates," Policy Research Working Paper Series 8738, The World Bank.
    7. de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Other publications TiSEM 54f2c3e3-46f2-4763-b1ac-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Garriga, Ana Carolina & Rodriguez, Cesar M., 2020. "More effective than we thought: Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 87-105.
    9. Nolivos, Roberto Delhy & Vuletin, Guillermo, 2014. "The role of central bank independence on optimal taxation and seigniorage," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 440-458.
    10. Oriola, Hugo, 2023. "Political monetary cycles: An empirical study," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    11. Qureshi, Irfan, "undated". "Monetary Policy Shifts and Central Bank Independence," Economic Research Papers 269096, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    12. Strong, Christine & Yayi, Constant L., 2023. "The political affiliation of central bankers and government debt: Evidence from Africa," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 603-620.
    13. Berggren, Niclas & Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov & Hellström, Jörgen, 2014. "Social trust and central-bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 425-439.
    14. Strong, Christine & Yayi, Constant, 2021. "Central bank independence, fiscal deficits and currency union: Lessons from Africa," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    15. Strong, Christine Olivia, 2021. "Political influence, central bank independence and inflation in Africa: A comparative analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    16. Belke, Ansgar & Freytag, Andreas & Keil, Jonas & Schneider, Friedrich, 2014. "The credibility of monetary policy announcements: Empirical evidence for OECD countries since the 1960s," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 217-227.

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