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The Credibility of Monetary Policy Announcements - Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1960s

Author

Listed:
  • Ansgar Belke

    () (University of Duisburg-Essen and IZA Bonn)

  • Andreas Freytag

    () (Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena)

  • Johannes Keil

    () (University of Duisburg-Essen)

  • Friedrich Schneider

    () (Johannes-Kepler-University Linz)

Abstract

Monetary policy rules have been considered as fundamental protection against inflation. However, empirical evidence for a correlation between rules and inflation is relatively weak. In this paper, we first discuss likely causes for this weak link and present the argument that monetary commitment is not credible in itself. It can grant price stability best if it is backed by an adequate assignment of economic policy. An empirical assessment based on panel data covering five decades and 22 OECD countries confirms the crucial role of a credibly backed monetary commitment to price stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Ansgar Belke & Andreas Freytag & Johannes Keil & Friedrich Schneider, 2012. "The Credibility of Monetary Policy Announcements - Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1960s," Global Financial Markets Working Paper Series 2012-34, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:hlj:hljwrp:34-2012
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Belke, Ansgar, 2013. "Impact of a Low Interest Rate Environment - Global Liquidity Spillovers and the Search-for-yield," Ruhr Economic Papers 429, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    2. Belke, Ansgar, 2017. "Central bank communication: Managing expectations through the monetary dialogue," Ruhr Economic Papers 692, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    3. Hamza Bennani, 2016. "Media Coverage and ECB Policy-Making: Evidence from a New Index," EconomiX Working Papers 2016-38, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    4. Cavallo, Antonella & Ribba, Antonio, 2015. "Common macroeconomic shocks and business cycle fluctuations in Euro area countries," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 377-392.
    5. Ansgar Belke & Florian Verheyen, 2014. "The Low-Interest-Rate Environment, Global Liquidity Spillovers and Challenges for Monetary Policy Ahead," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 56(2), pages 313-334, June.
    6. Ansgar Belke, 2013. "Impact of a Low Interest Rate Environment - Global Liquidity Spillovers and the Search-for-yield," Ruhr Economic Papers 0429, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    7. repec:zbw:rwirep:0429 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    credibility; central bank independence; price stability; monetary commitment;

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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