On the Assessment and Implementation of 'Institutional' Remedies
The most common approach to testing for the benefits of central-bank independence is argued to be methodologically flawed for the reason that the measure of independence does not permit a test of the hypothesis which suggests that these benefits exist. Particular doubt is cast on the merits of proposals to legislate to create independence. The argument is elucidated by comparison with the testing of a hypothesis about the benefits of centralized and decentralized unions. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.
Volume (Year): 48 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://oep.oupjournals.org/
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:48:y:1996:i:1:p:39-51. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.