IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v124y2005i3p391-409.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The credibility of monetary reform – New evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Andreas Freytag

    ()

Abstract

The history of monetary policy is characterised by crisis and reform. The paper is dedicated to an explanation of what makes monetary reforms successful. A cross-sectional econometric analysis is chosen to deal with this problem. It is based on a standard macroeconomic model of commitment and credibility. As the dependent variable, we calculate a post-reform inflation rate. The exogenous variables are the degree of legal commitment, the constraining influence of institutions and a new variable for ex-ante credibility of the reform. The paper allows for the conclusion that monetary commitment, the consideration of institutional constraints and abstinence from the money press are crucial for the success of a monetary reform. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Freytag, 2005. "The credibility of monetary reform – New evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 391-409, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:124:y:2005:i:3:p:391-409
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-2055-1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-005-2055-1
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andreas Freytag, 2001. "Does central bank independence reflect monetary commitment properly? Methodical considerations," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 54(217), pages 181-208.
    2. Stanley Fischer & Ratna Sahay & Carlos A. Végh, 2002. "Modern Hyper- and High Inflations," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(3), pages 837-880, September.
    3. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    4. Klein,Martin & Neumann,Manfred, "undated". "Seignorage: What is it and who gets it?," Discussion Paper Serie B 124, University of Bonn, Germany.
    5. Robert J. Barro, 1983. "Inflationary Finance under Discretion and Rules," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 1-16, February.
    6. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, January.
    7. Hayo, Bernd, 1998. "Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 241-263, May.
    8. Fischer, Stanley, 1983. "Indexing and inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 519-541, November.
    9. McCallum, Bennett T., 1997. "Crucial issues concerning central bank independence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June.
    10. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-838, May.
    11. Freytag Andreas, 1998. "Einige Anmerkungen zur Wahl der Reservewährung eines Currency Boards," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 47(1), pages 3-19, April.
    12. Mas, Ignacio, 1995. "Things Governments Do to Money: A Recent History of Currency Reform Schemes and Scams," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 483-512.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Andreas Freytag & Friedrich Schneider, 2007. "Monetary Commitment, Institutional Constraints and Inflation: Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1970s," Jena Economic Research Papers 2007-002, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    2. repec:onb:oenbwp:y::i:129:b:1 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Belke, Ansgar & Freytag, Andreas & Keil, Jonas & Schneider, Friedrich, 2014. "The credibility of monetary policy announcements: Empirical evidence for OECD countries since the 1960s," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 217-227.
    4. Belke, Ansgar H. & Herz, Bernhard & Vogel, Lukas, 2005. "Structural Reforms and the Exchange Rate Regime: A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries," IZA Discussion Papers 1798, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    5. Ansgar Belke & Andreas Freytag & Jonas Keil & Friedrich Schneider, 2012. "The Credibility of Monetary Policy Announcements – Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1960s," Ruhr Economic Papers 0355, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    6. Ansgar Belke & Bernhard Herz & Lukas Vogel, 2006. "Exchange Rate Regimes and Reforms: A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 317-342, December.
    7. repec:zbw:rwirep:0355 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Ansgar Belke & Bernhard Herz & Lukas Vogel, 2006. "Beyond Trade – Is Reform Effort Affected by the Exchange Rate Regime? A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries," Economie Internationale, CEPII research center, issue 107, pages 29-58.
    9. Ansgar Belke & Bernhard Herz & Lukas Vogel, 2006. "Are Monetary Rules and Reforms Complements or Substitutes? A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries," Working Papers 129, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:124:y:2005:i:3:p:391-409. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.