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Exchange Rate Regimes and Reforms: A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries

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  • Ansgar Belke
  • Bernhard Herz
  • Lukas Vogel

Abstract

This paper examines the contemporaneous relationship between the exchange rate regime and structural economic reforms over a period of 30 years. Using panel data techniques, we look at both a broad ‘world sample’ and an OECD country sample. We investigate empirically whether structural reforms have complemented or substituted for monetary commitment in the attempt to improve macroeconomic performance. Our results suggest that, on average, an exchange rate rule positively correlates with the amount of overall structural reforms and of trade liberalization in particular. However, we do not find a significant and robust impact of exchange rate commitment on labour and product market reform. The results are similar for both the wider, more heterogeneous world sample and the panel of OECD economies. They contradict the hypothesis that exchange rate commitments may have slowed the pace of structural reform, but neither provides robust evidence that losing the possibility of an exchange rate adjustment promotes labour and product market reforms.

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  • Ansgar Belke & Bernhard Herz & Lukas Vogel, 2006. "Exchange Rate Regimes and Reforms: A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 317-342, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:intfin:v:9:y:2006:i:3:p:317-342
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2362.2006.00184.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Ansgar Belke & Lukas Vogel, 2015. "Monetary commitment and structural reforms: a dynamic panel analysis for transition economies," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 375-392, September.
    2. Stefan Hohberger & Marco Ratto & Lukas Vogel, 2020. "The euro exchange rate and Germany's trade surplus," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 85-103, March.
    3. Ansgar Belke, 2014. "Exit Strategies and Their Impact on the Euro Area - A Model Based View," Ruhr Economic Papers 0467, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    4. Belke, Ansgar & Gros, Daniel, 2017. "Optimal adjustment paths in a monetary union," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 338-345.
    5. Ansgar Belke & Lukas Vogel, 2012. "Monetary Commitment and Structural Reforms – A Dynamic Panel Analysis for Transition Economies," Ruhr Economic Papers 0347, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    6. Holger Zemanek & Ansgar Belke & Gunther Schnabl, 2010. "Current account balances and structural adjustment in the euro area," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 83-127, May.
    7. repec:zbw:rwirep:0467 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Ansgar Belke, 2014. "Exit Strategies and Their Impact on the Euro Area – A Model Based View," ROME Working Papers 201401, ROME Network.
    9. Ansgar Belke, 2015. "The Strength of the Euro ¨C Challenges for ECB Monetary Policy," Research in World Economy, Research in World Economy, Sciedu Press, vol. 6(1), pages 72-84, March.
    10. Holger Zemanek & Ansgar Belke & Gunther Schnabl, 2009. "Current Account Imbalances and Structural Adjustment in the Euro Area: How to Rebalance Competitiveness," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 895, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    11. Madhu Sehrawat & A. K. Giri, 2019. "Do Globalization and Institutional Reforms Matter for Financial Structure in Selected Asian Countries? A Panel Data Approach," Applied Economics Quarterly (formerly: Konjunkturpolitik), Duncker & Humblot GmbH, Berlin, vol. 65(2), pages 87-100.
    12. repec:zbw:rwirep:0347 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Robert A. Lawson & Ryan Murphy & Benjamin Powell, 2020. "The Determinants Of Economic Freedom: A Survey," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(4), pages 622-642, October.
    14. Helena Glebocki Keefe, 2020. "The impact of exchange rate volatility on inflation targeting monetary policy in emerging and advanced economies," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 417-433, December.

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