Monetary Union, Entry Conditions and Economic Reform
This paper models the behaviour of a potential entrant into a monetary union where there is an inflation entry condition. In addition to making a monetary policy decision during a qualifying period, the potential entrant must make a decision about structural reform. The paper shows that the entry condition can have two undesirable effects. First, it can lead to multiple equilibria because inflationary expectations acquire a self-fulfilling property. Second, the entry condition can lead to a reduction in the amount of reform. This is because the entry condition reduces inflationary expectations and thus reduces the incentive to reform.
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- Buiter, Willem H., 1995.
"Macroeconomic Policy During a Transition to Monetary Union,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1222, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- W.H. Buiter, 1995. "Macroeconomic Policy During a Transition to Monetary Union," CEP Discussion Papers dp0261, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Willem H. Buiter, 1995. "Macroeconomic policy during a transition to monetary union," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20701, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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"A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model,"
NBER Working Papers
0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Winkler, B, 1997. "Of Sticks and Carrots. Incentives and the Maastricht Road to EMU," Economics Working Papers eco97/02, European University Institute.
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- Sibert, Anne, 1997.
"Monetary Integration and Economic Convergence,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1561, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Artis, Michael, 1996. "Alternative Transitions to EMU," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(437), pages 1005-15, July.
- De Grauwe, Paul, 1996. "Monetary union and convergence economics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 1091-1101, April.
- Ozkan, F. Gulcin & Sutherland, Alan, 1998.
"A currency crisis model with an optimising policymaker,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 339-364, April.
- Gulcin Ozkan & Alan Sutherland, . "A Currency Crisis Model with an Optimising Policymaker," Discussion Papers 96/11, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Maurice Obstfeld, 1994. "The Logic of Currency Crises," NBER Working Papers 4640, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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