IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Fiscal reform and monetary union in West Africa

  • Carsten Hefeker

This paper explores the interaction between the proposed monetary union for ECOWAS and structural reforms of fiscal policy. In a monetary union among symmetric countries members run a more distortionary fiscal policy and structural reform efforts fall. This can also follow in countries that adopt a unilateral peg or a foreign currency. In a monetary union with asymmetric countries reforms increase in countries that are relatively less distorted and the reverse happens in more distorted economies. Most West African Economic and Monetary Union members are thus likely to have a less distortionary fiscal policy after forming a monetary union with other ECOWAS members. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/jid.1529
File Function: Link to full text; subscription required
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Journal of International Development.

Volume (Year): 22 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 86-102

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:22:y:2010:i:1:p:86-102
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/5102/home

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Beetsma Roel M.W.J. & Bovenberg A. Lans, 1995. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Research Memorandum 024, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. Patrick Honohan & Stephen A. O'Connell, 1997. "Contrasting Monetary Regimes in Africa," IMF Working Papers 97/64, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Etienne B. Yehoue, 2005. "On the Pattern of Currency Blocs in Africa," IMF Working Papers 05/45, International Monetary Fund.
  4. Beetsma, Roel & Uhlig, Harald, 1999. "An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 546-71, October.
  5. David Fielding & Kalvinder Shields, 2003. "Economic Integration in West Africa: Does the CFA Make a Difference?," Discussion Papers in Economics 03/8, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
  6. Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik, 1999. "Structural Convergence Under Reversible and Irreversible Monetary Unification," CEPR Discussion Papers 2116, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Discussion Paper 1995-59, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  8. Clausen, Volker & Wohltmann, Hans-Werner, 2005. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Large Asymmetric Monetary Union - A Dynamic Three-Country Analysis," Economics Working Papers 2005,18, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
  9. Paul R. Masson & Xavier Debrun & Catherine A. Pattillo, 2002. "Monetary Union in West Africa: Who Might Gain, Who Might Lose, and Why?," IMF Working Papers 02/226, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Anne C. Sibert & Alan Sutherland, . "Monetary Regimes and Labour Market Reform," Discussion Papers 97/14, Department of Economics, University of York.
  11. Ernesto Hernández-Catá & C. A. François, 1998. "The West African Economic and Monetary Union: Recent Developments and Policy Issues," IMF Occasional Papers 170, International Monetary Fund.
  12. Fielding, David, 1996. "Asymmetries in the Behaviour of Members of a Monetary Union: A Game-Theoretic Model with an Application to West Africa," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 5(3), pages 343-65, October.
  13. Stanley Fischer & Ratna Sahay & Carlos A. Végh Gramont, 2002. "Modern Hyper- and High Inflations," IMF Working Papers 02/197, International Monetary Fund.
  14. Guillaume, Dominique M. & Stasavage, David, 2000. "Improving Policy Credibility: Is There a Case for African Monetary Unions?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(8), pages 1391-1407, August.
  15. Ozkan, F Gulcin & Sibert, Anne & Sutherland, Alan, 1997. "Monetary Union, Entry Conditions and Economic Reform," CEPR Discussion Papers 1720, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Stasavage, David, 1997. "The CFA Franc Zone and Fiscal Discipline," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 6(1), pages 132-67, March.
  17. Romain Veyrune, 2007. "Fixed Exchange Rates and the Autonomy of Monetary Policy: The Franc Zone Case," IMF Working Papers 07/34, International Monetary Fund.
  18. Easterly, William, 1999. "When is fiscal adjustment an illusion?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2109, The World Bank.
  19. Stanley Fischer & Ratna Sahay & Carlos A. V�gh, 2002. "Modern Hyper- and High Inflations," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(3), pages 837-880, September.
  20. Fatás, Antonio & Rose, Andrew K, 2001. "Do Monetary Handcuffs Restrain Leviathan? Fiscal Policy in Extreme Exchange Rate Regimes," CEPR Discussion Papers 2692, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  21. Honohan, Patrick & Lane, Philip R., 2000. "Will the Euro trigger more monetary unions in Africa?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2393, The World Bank.
  22. Etienne B. Yehoue, 2007. "The CFA Arrangements: More than Just An Aid Substitute?," IMF Working Papers 07/19, International Monetary Fund.
  23. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2003. "Symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-247, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:22:y:2010:i:1:p:86-102. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)

or (Christopher F. Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.