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On policy interactions among nations : when do cooperation and commitment matter ?

  • Hubert Kempf

    ()

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, Banque de France - Direction de la Recherche)

  • Leopold Von Thadden

    ()

    (European Central Bank - ECB)

This paper offers a framework to study commitment and cooperation issues in games with multiple policymakers. To reconcile some puzzles in the recent literature on the nature of policy interactions among nations, we prove that games characterized by different commitment and cooperation schemes can admit the same equilibrium outcome if certain spillover effects vanish at the common solution of these games. We provide a detailed discussion of these spillovers, showing that, in general, commitment and cooperation are non-trivial issues. Yet, in linear-quadratic models with multiple policymakers commitment and cooperation schemes are shown to become irrelevant under certain assumptions. The framework is sufficiently general to cover a broad range of results from the recent literature on policy interactions as special cases, both within monetary unions and among fully sovereign nations.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00344773.

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Date of creation: Nov 2008
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Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00344773
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00344773
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