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Monetary And Fiscal Policies Interaction In Monetary Unions

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  • Pasquale Foresti

Abstract

In this paper, the literature on the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union is surveyed. By adopting the concept of symbiosis as a starting point, the paper highlights the importance of uncertainty, policy makers' preferences and targets. Then, the role of commitment to policy rules and coordination is addressed. The analysis also focuses on the importance of the data considered for the generation of the policy mix. As a final step, the paper discusses the main results in the literature on public debt management in a monetary union. All the reported theoretical results are then adopted to retrieve policy and institutional implications for the European Monetary Union.

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  • Pasquale Foresti, 2018. "Monetary And Fiscal Policies Interaction In Monetary Unions," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 226-248, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:32:y:2018:i:1:p:226-248
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    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12194
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    Cited by:

    1. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2018. "To Be or not to Be a Euro Country? The Behavioural Political Economics of Currency Unions," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1883, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    2. Pasquale Foresti & Ugo Marani, 2014. "Expansionary Fiscal Consolidations: Theoretical Underpinnings and their Implications for the Eurozone," Contributions to Political Economy, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 19-33.
    3. Georgios Magkonis & Vasileios Logothetis & Kalliopi-Maria Zekente, 2019. "Does the Left Spend More?," Working Papers in Economics & Finance 2019-03, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth Business School, Economics and Finance Subject Group.
    4. repec:eee:jmacro:v:59:y:2019:i:c:p:103-122 is not listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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