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Policy uncertainty, symbiosis, and the optimal fiscal and monetary conservativeness

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  • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo

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  • Francesco Giuli
  • Marco Manzo

Abstract

This paper extends the stabilization game between monetary and fiscal authorities to the case of multiplicative (model) uncertainty. In this context, the “symbiosis assumption”, i.e. fiscal and monetary policy share the same ideal targets, no longer guarantees the achievement of ideal output and inflation, unless the ideal output is equal to its natural level. A time consistency problem arises.
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Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Francesco Giuli & Marco Manzo, 2009. "Policy uncertainty, symbiosis, and the optimal fiscal and monetary conservativeness," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 36(4), pages 461-474, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:empiri:v:36:y:2009:i:4:p:461-474
    DOI: 10.1007/s10663-009-9104-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Canofari, Paolo & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, 2017. "Regime switches under policy uncertainty in monetary unions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 124-132.
    2. Meixing Dai & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2011. "Fiscal disciplining effect of central bank opacity: Stackelberg versus Nash equilibrium," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(4), pages 3068-3076.
    3. Engwerda, Jacob & Mahmoudinia, D. & Isfahani, Rahim Dalali, 2016. "Government and Central Bank Interaction under uncertainty : A Differential Games Approach," Discussion Paper 2016-012, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Foresti, Pasquale, 2017. "Monetary and fiscal policies in interaction in monetary unions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69623, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Olga S. Kuznetsova & Sergey A. Merzlyakov, 2015. "The Role of Uncertain Government Preferences For Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interaction," HSE Working papers WP BRP 102/EC/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    6. Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Giuli, Francesco, 2011. "Fiscal and monetary interaction under monetary policy uncertainty," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 369-375, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary-fiscal policy interactions; Nash equilibrium uncertainty; Symbiosis; E61; E63;

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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