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Caution and Conservatism in the Making of Monetary Policy

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  • Schellekens, Philip

Abstract

Does society benefit from the delegation of monetary policy to cautious and conservative central bankers? We offer a critical view on the delegation literature and relax seemingly innocuous assumptions about uncertainty and preferences. First, caution improves credibility but does not obviate the need for central-bank conservatism. Second, previous models of delegation have focused on suboptimal forms of conservatism. We derive optimal concepts of conservatism that mitigate, or eliminate, any residual problem of credibility. Third, we rationalize why credible monetary policy may be conducive to stable inflation and output.

Suggested Citation

  • Schellekens, Philip, 2002. "Caution and Conservatism in the Making of Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(1), pages 160-177, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:34:y:2002:i:1:p:160-77
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    Cited by:

    1. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Francesco Giuli & Marco Manzo, 2009. "Policy uncertainty, symbiosis, and the optimal fiscal and monetary conservativeness," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 36(4), pages 461-474, November.
    2. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Marco Manzo, 2010. "Fiscal Policy Under Balanced Budget And Indeterminacy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 57(4), pages 455-472, September.
    3. Bray, Margaret & Goodhart, Charles, 2002. "You might as well be hung for a sheep as a lamb: the loss function of an agent," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24937, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Charles Goodhart & Margaret Bray, 2002. "You Might as Well be Hung for a Sheep as a Lamb: The Loss Function of an Agent," FMG Discussion Papers dp418, Financial Markets Group.
    5. Hermann Sintim-Aboagye, 2005. "Emerging Economies, Turnover Rates and Inflation Variability: A Comparison of Generalized Maximum Likelihood and SUR Models," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 167-178, June.
    6. Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Giuli, Francesco, 2011. "Fiscal and monetary interaction under monetary policy uncertainty," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 369-375, June.
    7. Lawler, Phillip, 2007. "Strategic wage setting, inflation uncertainty and optimal delegation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 1105-1118, December.
    8. Phillip Lawler & Jonathan James, 2005. "Macroeconomic Shocks and Central Bank Disclosure Policy: Is increased Transparency Necessarily Beneficial?," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 27, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
    9. Emmanuel Carré & Jézabel Couppey-Soubeyran & Salim Dehmej, 2015. "La coordination entre politique monétaire et politique macroprudentielle. Que disent les modèles dsge ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 66(3), pages 541-572.
    10. Maria Demertzis & Nicola Viegi, 2006. "Aiming for the Bull's Eye: Uncertainty and Inertia in Monetary Policy," Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 150, Society for Computational Economics.
    11. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Eric Le Borgne, 2010. "A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(4), pages 647-677, June.
    12. Felipe Morandé & Mauricio Tejada, 2008. "Sources of Uncertainty for Conducting Monetary Policy in Chile," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 492, Central Bank of Chile.
    13. Kobayashi, Teruyoshi, 2003. "Multiplicative uncertainty in a model without inflationary bias," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 317-321, September.
    14. Timo Henckel, 2010. "Monopolistic unions, Brainard uncertainty, and optimal monetary policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(2), pages 307-322, April.
    15. Felipe Morandé L. & Mauricio Tejada G., 2008. "Sources of Uncertainty in Monetary Policy Conduct in Chile," Journal Economía Chilena (The Chilean Economy), Central Bank of Chile, vol. 11(3), pages 45-80, December.

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