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Macroeconomic Shocks and Central Bank Disclosure Policy: Is increased Transparency Necessarily Beneficial?

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  • Phillip Lawler

    (University of Wales, Swansea)

  • Jonathan James

    (University of Wales, Swansea)

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  • Phillip Lawler & Jonathan James, 2005. "Macroeconomic Shocks and Central Bank Disclosure Policy: Is increased Transparency Necessarily Beneficial?," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 27, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:27
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