How much should central banks talk?: A new argument
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References listed on IDEAS
- Alex Cukierman, 2002.
"Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic models and objectives and what difference does it make?,"
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 15-36.
- Cukierman, Alex, 2001. "Are Contemporary Central Banks Transparent about Economic Models and Objectives and What Difference Does it Make?," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2001,05, Deutsche Bundesbank.
- Hahn, Volker & Gersbach, Hans, 2001. "Voting Transparency and Conflicting Interests in Central Bank Councils," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2001,03, Deutsche Bundesbank.
- Gruner, Hans Peter & Hefeker, Carsten, 1999. " How Will EMU Affect Inflation and Unemployment in Europe?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 101(1), pages 33-47, March.
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Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(4), pages 655-683, May.
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"Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment - Theory and Evidence,"
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1847, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alex Cukierman & Francesco Lippi, 1998. "Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment: Theory and Evidence," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 332, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Cukierman, A. & Lippi, F., 1998. "Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment: Theory and Evidence," Papers 332, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
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