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Central banks and information provided to the private sector

  • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo

    ()

    (Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza", Facoltà di Economia, Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica, Roma (Italy))

  • Enrico Marchetti

    ()

    (Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza", Facoltà di Economia, Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica, Roma (Italy))

This paper examines the information provided to the private sector by centralbanks. By using the principal component analysis, we investigated the variance of the procedural rules followed by nine major central banks about informationtreatments. We investigate problems related to the information coming from thecentral banks by focusing on the quantity and quality perspectives and highlight the methodological complexity of the investigation. We find that a synthetic quantitative index of transparency is not enough to represent the phenomenon since it can result misleading in understanding the behavior of institutionally different central banksassociated with the same index values.

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File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/9829/9714
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Article provided by Banca Nazionale del Lavoro in its journal Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review.

Volume (Year): 57 (2004)
Issue (Month): 230 ()
Pages: 265-295

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Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlqrr:2004:32
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  1. Alex Cukierman & Francesco Lippi, 1998. "Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment: Theory and Evidence," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 332, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  2. Jon Faust & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1999. "The equilibrium degree of transparency and control in monetary policy," International Finance Discussion Papers 651, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  3. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Geraats, Petra M, 2002. "How Transparent are Central Banks?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3188, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Lawler, Phillip, 2001. "Monetary Policy, Central Bank Objectives, and Social Welfare with Strategic Wage Setting," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 94-113, January.
  5. Svensson, Lars E.O. & Faust, John, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Seminar Papers 636, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  6. Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2007. "Central Bank transparency in theory and practice," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 760-789, December.
  7. Gylfason, Thorvaldur & Lindbeck, Assar, 1994. " The Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wages," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(1-2), pages 33-46, April.
  8. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
  9. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  10. Alex Cukierman, 2002. "Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic models and objectives and what difference does it make?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 15-36.
  11. Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2000. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2353, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  13. Matthew B. Canzoneri, 1983. "Monetary policy games and the role of private information," International Finance Discussion Papers 249, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  14. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Viegi, Nicola, 2001. "Credibility, Transparency and Asymmetric Information in Monetary Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2671, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-88701 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 1999. "The case for a populist Central Banker," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1317-1344, June.
  17. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment:: Theory and some evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1395-1434, June.
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