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The Cost Of Social Pacts

Listed author(s):
  • Nicola Acocella
  • Giovanni Bartolomeo

Social pacts, while improving macroeconomic performance, usually impose costs on unions. To facilitate the formation of such pacts, various substitutes can operate, such as the payment of transfers or, to some extent, the conservativeness of the government, union’s inflation aversion or political partisanship.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/boer.2013.65.issue-3
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Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Bulletin of Economic Research.

Volume (Year): 65 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (07)
Pages: 238-255

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Handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:65:y:2013:i:3:p:238-255
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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 1998. "Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment - Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 1847, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Gartner, Manfred, 2000. " Political Macroeconomics: A Survey of Recent Developments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 527-561, December.
  3. Cubitt, Robin P, 1992. "Monetary Policy Games and Private Sector Precommitment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 513-530, July.
  4. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2007. "Is Corporatism Feasible?," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 340-359, 05.
  5. Detken, Carsten & Gartner, Manfred, 1992. "Governments, Trade Unions and the Macroeconomy: An Expository Analysis of the Political Business Cycle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 37-53, January.
  6. Skott, Peter, 1997. "Stagflationary Consequences of Prudent Monetary Policy in a Unionized Economy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 609-622, October.
  7. Lawler, Phillip, 2000. "Union Wage Setting and Exchange Rate Policy," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 67(265), pages 91-100, February.
  8. Cubitt, Robin P, 1995. " Corporatism, Monetary Policy and Macroeconomic Performance: A Simple Game Theoretic Analysis," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(2), pages 245-259, June.
  9. Lippi, F., 2000. "Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage-Setters," Papers 374, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
  10. Soskice, David & Iversen, Torben, 1998. "Multiple Wage-Bargaining Systems in the Single European Currency Area," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(3), pages 110-124, Autumn.
  11. Fabrizio Coricelli & Alex Cukierman & Alberto Dalmazzo, 2006. "Monetary Institutions, Monopolistic Competition, Unionized Labor Markets and Economic Performance," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(1), pages 39-63, 03.
  12. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Pauwels, Wilfried, 2007. "Is there any scope for corporatism in stabilization policies?," MPRA Paper 3584, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Labour Markets and Monetary Union: A Strategic Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 2236, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Avdagic, Sabina & Rhodes, Martin & Visser, Jelle, 2005. "The Emergence and Evolution of Social Pacts: A Provisional Framework for Comparative Analysis," European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) 1, CONNEX and EUROGOV networks.
  16. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
  17. CAEYERS, Bet & PAUWELS, Wilfried, 2006. "Corporatism and macroeconomic stabilization policies," Working Papers 2006035, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
  18. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Patrizio Tirelli, 2007. "From First- to Second-Generation Social Pacts," AIEL Series in Labour Economics, in: Nicola Acocella & Riccardo Leoni (ed.), Social Pacts, Employment and Growth. A Reappraisal of Ezio Tarantelli’s Thought, edition 1, chapter 12, pages 239-251 AIEL - Associazione Italiana Economisti del Lavoro.
  19. Lawler, Phillip, 2001. "Monetary Policy, Central Bank Objectives, and Social Welfare with Strategic Wage Setting," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 94-113, January.
  20. Gylfason, Thorvaldur & Lindbeck, Assar, 1994. "The Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wages," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(1-2), pages 33-46, April.
  21. Carsten Hefeker & Helge Berger & Ronnie Schlöb, 2002. "Optimal Central Bank Conservatism and Monopoly Trade Unions," IMF Working Papers 02/44, .
  22. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
  23. Jerger, Jurgen, 2002. "Socially optimal monetary policy institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 761-781, November.
  24. Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 1999. "The case for a populist Central Banker," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1317-1344, June.
  25. Acocella, Nicola & Ciccarone, Giuseppe, 1997. "Trade Unions, Nonneutrality and Stagflation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 161-178, April.
  26. Lawler, Phillip, 2000. "Centralised Wage Setting, Inflation Contracts, and the Optimal Choice of Central Banker," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(463), pages 559-575, April.
  27. Coricelli, Fabrizio & Cukierman, Alex & Dalmazzo, Alberto, 2001. "Economic Performance and Stabilization Policy in a Monetary Union with Imperfect Labour and Goods Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 2745, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  28. Oswald, Andrew J, 1985. " The Economic Theory of Trade Unions: An Introductory Survey," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 87(2), pages 160-193.
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