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Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice

  • Petra M. Geraats

Transparency has become one of the main features of monetary policymaking during the last decade. This article establishes stylized facts and provides a systematic overview of the practice of monetary policy transparency around the world. It shows much diversity in information disclosure, even for central banks with the same monetary policy framework, including inflation targeting. Nevertheless, the study finds significant differences in transparency across monetary policy frameworks. The empirical findings are explained using key insights distilled from the theoretical literature. Thus, this article aims to bridge the gap between the theory and practice of monetary policy transparency. (JEL codes: E58, D82) Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

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Article provided by CESifo in its journal CESifo Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 52 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 111-152

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Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:52:y:2006:i:1:p:111-152
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