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Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice

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  • Geraats, P.M

Abstract

Transparency has become one of the main features of monetary policymaking during the last decade. This paper establishes some stylized facts. In addition, it provides a systematic overview of the practice of monetary policy transparency around the world. It shows much diversity in information disclosure, even for central banks with the same monetary policy framework, including inflation targeting. Nevertheless, the paper finds significant differences in transparency across monetary policy frameworks. The empirical findings are explained using key insights distilled from the theoretical literature. Thus, this paper aims to bridge the gap between the theory and practice of monetary policy transparency.

Suggested Citation

  • Geraats, P.M, 2005. "Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0549, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0549
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    : Transparency; monetary policy; central bank communication;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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