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Is bank supervision central to central banking?

Author

Listed:
  • Joe Peek
  • Eric Rosengren
  • Geoffrey M. B. Tootell

Abstract

Recently, several central banks have lost their bank supervisory responsibilities, in part because it has not been shown that supervisory authority improves the conduct of monetary policy. This paper finds that confidential bank supervisory information could help the Board staff more accurately forecast important macroeconomic variables and is used by FOMC members to guide monetary policy. These findings suggest that the complementarity between supervisory responsibilities and monetary policy should be an important consideration when evaluating the structure of the central bank.

Suggested Citation

  • Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is bank supervision central to central banking?," Working Papers 99-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedbwp:99-7
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    Keywords

    bank examinations; Bank supervision; Banks and banking; Central; Monetary policy;
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