Is bank supervision central to central banking?
Recently, several central banks have lost their bank supervisory responsibilities, in part because it has not been shown that supervisory authority improves the conduct of monetary policy. This paper finds that confidential bank supervisory information could help the Board staff more accurately forecast important macroeconomic variables and is used by FOMC members to guide monetary policy. These findings suggest that the complementarity between supervisory responsibilities and monetary policy should be an important consideration when evaluating the structure of the central bank.
|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 600 Atlantic Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts 02210|
Web page: http://www.bos.frb.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Email: |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Benjamin M. Friedman & Kenneth N. Kuttner, 1996.
"A Price Target for U.S. Monetary Policy? Lessons from the Experience with Money Growth Targets,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 27(1), pages 77-146.
- Benjamin M. Friedman & Kenneth N. Kuttner, 1996. "A price target for U.S. monetary policy? Lessons from the experience with money growth targets," Working Paper Series, Macroeconomic Issues WP-96-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Friedman, Benjamin M & Kuttner, Kenneth N, 1992. "Money, Income, Prices, and Interest Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 472-92, June.
- Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1995.
"Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 27-48, Fall.
- Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," Working Papers 95-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," NBER Working Papers 5146, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, 1997. "Central bank independence and inflation targeting: monetary policy paradigms for the next millenium?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Jan, pages 19-36.
- Caprio, Gerard Jr. & Klingebiel, Daniela, 1996. "Bank insolvencies : cross-country experience," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1620, The World Bank.
- Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedbwp:99-7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Catherine Spozio)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.